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INTRODUCTION
here is no Taiwanese law. “Taiwan” does not exist as an
independent state under that official name, and there are
no laws issued by the “Taiwanese” government.
1
From a strictly
* Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. The creation of this Ar-
ticle was supported by sabbatical leave provided by Seton Hall University and
by the Fulbright Core Scholars Program. I would like to thank for their com-
ments Yu-jie Chen, Jerome Cohen, Thomas Gold, Sida Liu, Shelley Rigger,
Kai-ping Su, and Frank Upham, as well as the participants in the Workshop
on Works-in-Progress on Chinese Law at Yale Law School, the faculty of Aca-
demia Sinica’s Law Institute, and the many legal officials, practitioners, and
scholars who were so generous with their time during my year as a Fulbright
Scholar at National Taiwan University College of Law.
1. This Article does not seek to take a position on the long-standing philo-
sophical debates on the minimum necessary conditions for the creation of a
“legal system.” Compare JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
T
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legal perspective, the Republic of China (ROC) was established
in 1912 and is the formal title of the government now based in
Taipei.
2
The ROC is today recognized by only sixteen countries
and the Holy See,
3
and its existence is vehemently denied by the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the eyes of Beijing, the ROC
ceased to exist in 1949, and the island of Taiwan is an “inalien-
able part of China” that is beset by “separatist forces.”
4
Despite
this complicated backdrop, “Taiwan” looks, feels, and acts like a
country operating under that name. The “ROC” title is largely
relegated to formal government pronouncements, and it would
be surprising indeed for a ROC passport holder to respond that
she came from the “Republic of China” instead of simply “Tai-
wan.” A complex set of laws and institutions are at work in Tai-
wan (defined here as the areas under actual control of the ROC
government based in Taipei).
5
Living there is akin to living in
DETERMINED (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., 1954) (legal system as requiring sover-
eign to which subjects render obedience) with H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 50 (1961) (critiquing Austin in part based on persistence of law after ini-
tial sovereign has perished); see generally Sean Coyle, Hart, Raz and the Con-
cept of a Legal System, 21 L. & PHIL. 275 (2002) (critiquing legal positivism’s
view of the concept of a legal system). The starting point here, rather, is that
there is a legal system applying to people present in Taiwan (as a geographic
entity), but it still officially exists under the name of “the Republic of China,”
which itself has a disputed basis as a sovereign entity that is capable of enact-
ing laws. To have a “Taiwanese” legal system, there needs to be an explanation
of what is the “Taiwan” behind these laws, and, as explained later in this Ar-
ticle, this question is fraught. Cf. Joseph Raz, The Identity of Legal Systems,
59 CAL. L. REV. 795, 813 (1971) (“A theory of law must be based, at least partly,
on a theory of state . . . .”).
2. See TAIWAN.GOV.TW, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php (last vis-
ited May 23, 2019) (“The ROC was founded in 1912 in China.”). For continuing
use of “Republic of China” for laws, see, e.g., News, LAWS & REGULATIONS
DATABASE OF THE REP. OF CHINA, http://law.moj.gov.tw/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2019).
3. Diplomatic Allies, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D6 (last
visited June 19, 2019) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
4. See STATECOUNCIL OF THEPEOPLE’SREPUBLIC OFCHINA, THEONE-CHINA
PRINCIPLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE (2000), available at http://www.gov.cn/eng-
lish/official/2005-07/27/content_17613.htm [hereinafter STATE COUNCILWHITE
PAPER].
5. See About Taiwan, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/about.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (ROC “is sit-
uated in the West Pacific between Japan and the Philippines. Its jurisdiction
extends to the archipelagoes of Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, as well as numer-
ous other islets.”).
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any number of countries with a legislature, executive, and judi-
ciary.
6
These three branches create, implement, and interpret
laws that are “normative, institutionalized, and coercive.”
7
A debate is underway in Taiwan concerning the path of legal
reforms. The law applied in Taiwan today is rooted in the codes
that were written in mainland China and then applied to Tai-
wan after World War II by the Nationalist Party led by Chiang
Kai-shek.
8
Law in Taiwan has also been influenced by its long
history of indigenous peoples and arrivals of people from across
the strait,
9
foreign intervention through colonial rule,
10
and re-
cent, extensive legal transplants from Japan, Germany, and the
United States.
11
There has been a heavily technocratic bent to
reforms with experts dominating the legal system’s develop-
ment. Now, over thirty years since the end of martial law and
over twenty years since the first direct presidential election,
there are increasing calls for the legal system to be more en-
gaged with the broader population. The unflattering depiction of
judges as “dinosaurs” who are out of touch with contemporary
concerns epitomizes the perceived gap between the institutions
that implement the legal system and the people who are subject
6. The ROC Government has two additional branches: Control Yuan and
Examination Yuan. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R 44996, TAIWAN: ISSUES FORCONGRESS 5 (2017).
7. JOSEPHRAZ, THECONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (1970).
8. This Article uses the Romanization commonly applied to proper names.
In the absence of established convention, it uses Pinyin as the default.
9. See Wang Taisheng (王泰升), Gaishu Taiwan Fa de Lishi, Sixiang yu
Faxue (概述台灣法的歷史,思想與法學) [An Overview of Taiwan’s Legal History,
Thought and Study], 290 TAIWANL.J. (台灣法學雜誌) 13, 13²14 (2016) (explain-
ing influence on Taiwan’s legal development of indigenous peoples and contacts
with the Qing Dynasty); cf. J. Bruce Jacobs, Taiwan’s Colonial Experiences and
the Development of Ethnic Identities: Some Hypotheses, 5 TAIWAN IN COMP.
PERSPECTIVE 47²59 (2014) (examining roles of various ethnic groups in Tai-
wan’s history).
10. Taiwan was colonized by Japan most recently, but also had periods of
Spanish and Dutch rule. See CHANG-FALO, THELEGALCULTURE AND SYSTEM OF
TAIWAN 1²3 (2006).
11. See, e.g., Chang Wen-chen (張文貞), Chaoyue Ji Shou, Lizu Taiwan,
Maixiang Guoji de Faxue Yanjiu Qianjing, Keji bu 104 Nian Jiechu Yanjiu
Jiang (超越繼受、立足臺灣、邁向國際的法學研究前景, 科技部 104 年傑出研究
獎) [Prospects for Legal Research that Surpass Succession, is Based in Taiwan,
and Moves Internationally], RENWEN JI SHEHUIKEXUE YANJIU FAZHAN SI (人文
及社會科學研究發展司) [DEPT. OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES], June
2016, at 97.
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to it.
12
Taiwan is facing the challenge of moving from dinosaurs
to dynamism.
This Article was largely written while living in Taiwan during
the 2017²18 academic year and watching the reform debate play
out firsthand.
13
It thus focuses on events during this period,
though the trends discussed herein are ongoing at the time of
final edits in spring 2019. This Article argues that the legal sys-
tem in Taiwan is undergoing a transformation, albeit through a
process that is discordant, muddled, and halting: a new legal
identity is slowly being forged. It is being “forged” in the sense
that great effort is being expended to bring about change, though
the results of that process remain uncertain. The term “identity”
has many meanings. As used here, “identity” is the distinguish-
ing characteristics of an entity.
14
This type of “identity” as the
key features of a legal system is similar to what Joseph Raz de-
scribed as material unity:
The material unity of a legal system consists in its distinctive
characteristics; it depends on the content of its laws and on the
manner in which they are applied. When trying to explain the
characteristic features of a legal system we are not, of course,
looking for the detailed regulation of every legal institution.
Rather, we are looking for the all-pervasive principles and the
traditional institutional structure and practices that permeate
the system and lend to its distinctive character.
15
12. See Zhe Wei Faguan Gaosu Ni, Faguan Weishenme Laoshi Bei Ma
Konglong (這位法官告訴你，法官為什麼老是被罵恐龍) [This Judge Tells You
Why Judges are Always Called Dinosaurs], NEXTMAG., June 15, 2016, availa-
ble at http://www.nextmag.com.tw/realtimenews/news/40727177.
13. As such, this Article goes beyond formal legal rules to also incorporate
the broader cultural aspects of reform efforts. Cf. James Gordley, Comparison,
Law, and Culture: A Response to Pierre Legrand, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 135²
36 (2017) (Legal scholars have made efforts to “explain[] differences in legal
systems in terms of culture. . . . The topic of the Annual Meeting of the Amer-
ican Society of Comparative Law in 2007 was ¶Comparative Law and Culture.’
There was no shortage of speakers, and those present reacted warmly.”).
14. See Identity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/identity (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (one definition as “dis-
tinguishing character or personality of an individual”). Used in a different
sense, a person can have a “legal identity” (“合法身分”) meaning identification
credentials that allow for full social and economic participation in a state. See
Mariana Dahan, Reflections on the Future of Legal Identity, WORLDBANK (Apr.
28, 2015), http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/reflections-future-legal-identity.
15. Raz, supra note 1, at 796. An effort to describe the overarching features
of Taiwan’s legal system connects to the rich debate regarding “legal culture.”
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Complex debates about the legal system’s components continue
among law-trained elites in Taiwan, for example, regarding re-
forms to the Supreme Court’s structure.
16
What is new is the
growing emphasis on a more inclusive discussion regarding the
general principles that pervade the legal system, with a partic-
ular focus on criminal cases that tend to receive significant me-
dia attention. This debate has given greater voice to people be-
yond experts.
Specifically, there is an embracing of greater transparency,
clarity, and participation. This trio of animating principles is
seen first in the process of legal reform debates, i.e., the public
can see the debates, understand the contents of those debates,
and contribute their opinions to those debates. These principles
are also starting to be embedded in the substance of the new
practices that are emerging from this debate, i.e., the public will
be able see the legal system operating, understand the decisions
made by the system, and add their voices to the ongoing opera-
tion of the system. This combination of transparency, clarity,
and participation has the potential to weave the values and con-
cerns of contemporary Taiwanese society into the legal fabric.
A yet unanswered question is whether the system that
emerges from the reform debate will actually engage people in a
meaningful way. To the extent that the legal system in Taiwan
develops an identity that stresses connections with the general
public, a second layer of “identity” becomes involved: whether
that accessible legal system will become part of the group con-
sciousness of people in Taiwan. In other words, what is at stake
is not just changes to the legal system itself, but also whether
that system will contribute to a shared sense of identity. For ex-
ample, will a legal obligation to serve as a lay judge be part of
what it means to be Taiwanese? Will reforms that lowered the
threshold for putting referenda on the ballot engender a sense
See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, What is Legal Culture – An Anthropological Per-
spective, 5 J. COMP. L. 40, 43 (2010) (examining “the intellectual origins of the
concept of legal culture” and “develop[ing] a more complex model of legal cul-
ture by disentangling its constituent parts”).
16. See, e.g., Ye Qing-Yuan (葉慶元), Zhengshi “Yingshi Gaige” Dui Woguo
Xianzheng Zhifa de Weihai (正視「英式司改」對我國憲政法治的危害) [The
Harm of “Tsai Ing-wen-Style Reforms” to Our Country’s Constitutional Rule of
Law], STORMMEDIA (風傳媒) (May 14, 2019), http://bit.ly/2YNVckd (criticizing
proposals to reduce the number of Supreme Court judges); Matthew Strong,
Taiwan Supreme Court to Set Up Grand Chamber, TAIWAN NEWS (Jan. 18,
2018), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3344139.
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that to be Taiwanese includes a direct say in the content of leg-
islation?
17
The creation of a shared identity is of particular im-
portance to Taiwan because the question of what it means to be
Taiwanese as compared with Chinese³or some combination
thereof³is pervasive. One cannot live in Taiwan today without
encountering the many ways that people who call it home wres-
tle with who they are and what “Taiwan” means.
Creation of a group identity is a messy, complicated process.
The many holders of ROC citizenship are not going to converge
on a single, uniform conception of what it means to be “Taiwan-
ese,”
18
just as being “American,” “French,” or “Brazilian” are con-
tested concepts.
19
What is relevant here is that a dynamic pro-
cess is underway that could reshape the legal system applicable
to the over twenty-three million people who are ROC citizens,
and there is the potential for a shared connection with that legal
system to become one facet of what it means to be Taiwanese.
This inquiry is important because Taiwan is at a moment of pal-
pable uncertainty about its future.
20
The trajectory of legal reforms in Taiwan is largely a domestic
matter. It is, however, tied to considerations that extend beyond
Taiwan’s borders. The creation of a distinct legal identity has
the potential for both rewards and risk depending on how re-
forms are perceived by audiences in the PRC and around the
17. See Brian Hioe, Referendum Changes a Step Forward for Democratic
Experimentalism in Taiwan?, NEW BLOOM MAG. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://new-
bloommag.net/2017/12/13/changes-referendum-act/ (suggesting that Referen-
dum Act changes and related reforms may place Taiwan as “an experiment in
a more direct form of democracy than many western models”).
18. See generally CHANGING TAIWAN IDENTITIES (J. Bruce Jacobs & Peter
Kang eds., 2017) (analyzing how Taiwanese identities have changed after the
Taiwanization process that commenced in the 1990s).
19. See, e.g., James A. Morone, Still Crazy After All These Years: America’s
Long History of Political Delusion, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.²Apr. 2018, at 156 (ex-
plaining in reviewing Fantasyland by Kurt Andersen: “Running beneath the
parade of con artists and manias that Andersen deftly catalogs glints some-
thing more dangerous than illusions: a bitter contest over national identity
that political institutions may no longer be able to contain”).
20. See, e.g., Shelley Rigger, Taiwan on (the) Edge, FOREIGNPOL’YRES. INST.
(May 17, 2019), https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/05/taiwan-on-the-
edge/#.XOFqszuOUcB.email [hereinafter Rigger, Taiwan on (the) Edge] (“At
this moment, as Taiwan’s political parties battle over their presidential nomi-
nations, I am more worried about the future of the Taiwan Strait than I have
ever been.”).
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world.
21
On the rewards side, showing the world a legal system
that has cast off an authoritarian past can burnish Taiwan’s rep-
utation as a thriving democracy. “Free China”
22
³a misnomer
during extended martial law³is an apt description today. A sus-
tained, energetic, and often-contentious conversation between
Taiwan’s people and government regarding legal reforms creates
a stark contrast to the stifling of public criticism in the PRC. If
greater public engagement further results in enhanced protec-
tion for human rights, Taiwan has an even stronger case to dif-
ferentiate itself from the repressive practices that are on the rise
across the strait.
23
Accentuating a distinctive Taiwanese legal identity also car-
ries risk. The current PRC leadership has stressed safeguarding
territorial integrity as a core national interest for which there is
a “red line” that cannot be crossed.
24
PRC-state-run media has
railed against ROC President Tsai Ing-wen that she has been
“pushing forward all types of ¶implicit’ and ¶cultural’ Taiwan in-
dependence since assuming office.”
25
Thus, while there is much
to applaud in the open debate concerning the future of Taiwan’s
legal system, cultivating a distinctive identity that downplays
historic ROC roots also could raise the PRC government’s ire if
construed as part of what is pejoratively described by Beijing as
President Tsai’s de-Sinicization political agenda.
26
21. See Yang Zhong, Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan, 25 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 336, 336²37 (2016) (positing that “Taiwanese identity politics
has the potential to seriously impact cross-Taiwan Strait relations and re-
gional stability”).
22. Formosa Declaration, TIME, Nov. 3, 1958, at 20 (“After [Secretary of
State John Foster] Dulles departed, the Communists stopped shelling for a
while, and Red Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai, in a broadcast beamed at the
Free Chinese, announced that shore batteries would hold their fire every other
day . . . .”).
23. Cf.Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s Human Rights Revolution and China’s
Devolution, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 3, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/taiwans-
human-rights-revolution-and-chinas-devolution/.
24. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, China Threatens U.S. Congress for Crossing Its
‘Red Line’ on Taiwan, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/10/12/china-threatens-u-s-congress-for-
crossing-its-red-line-on-taiwan/?utm _term=.fe7821998ecd.
25. Taiwan Leader’s Soft Words Aren’t Fooling Anyone, GLOBAL TIMES (Oct.
11, 2017), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1069783.shtml.
26. See, e.g., 58% Tairen Ziren Zhongguoren Chuang 6 Nian Xin Gao (58%
台人自認中國人 創6年新高) [58% of Taiwanese Self-Identify as Chinese — A
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This is not to say that Taiwan’s introduction of lay participa-
tion in criminal trials will prompt Beijing to invade. The impli-
cation is that engaging Taiwan’s general population in legal re-
form debates and the actual operation of the resulting legal sys-
tem is but one of many ingredients in developing a broader “Tai-
wanese” identity. The more conspicuous the indications of “soft”
Taiwan independence become, the more they could exacerbate
already tense relations with Beijing. This Article does not take
a normative position on those tensions as a good or bad thing.
Whether tension is a tool necessary to effectuate positive change
or a path towards destructive conflict is for the people of Taiwan
to evaluate. The claim is simply that warnings from the PRC
government cast a gentle pall over the reshaping of the legal sys-
tem into one that is unabashedly Taiwanese.
Part I of this Article provides context by introducing the nu-
anced terminology that is inextricable from living in Taiwan to-
day. Part II turns to law and outlines the historical development
of the legal system in Taiwan. Part III argues that transparency,
clarity, and participation are animating principles of the current
reform debate and are beginning to emerge as characteristics of
Taiwan’s inchoate legal identity. Embedding these values into
Taiwan’s legal identity could, in turn, help foster a shared sense
of identity among the populace regarding what it means to be
Taiwanese. Part IV looks beyond Taiwan’s borders to posit that
reshaping Taiwan’s legal identity has the potential both to boost
Taiwan’s international standing and to further chafe cross-strait
tensions. A question to watch is whether the shadow of Beijing
might serve as a damper on legal innovation in Taiwan, a point
of contrast that emboldens Taiwan to celebrate its distinct sys-
tem, or perhaps some combination thereof.
I. THE COMPLICATED TERMINOLOGY OF TAIWAN
The terminology surrounding Taiwan is complex and sensi-
tive.
27
Even the U.S. government makes gaffes. In February
New 6 Year High], CHINA TIMES (中時電子報) (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.chi-
natimes.com/newspapers/20181019000204-260309 (positing that the poll “re-
flects the utter failure of the DPP government’s ¶de-sinicization’” (“這反映民進
黨政府「去中國化」徹底失敗”)).
27. See LAWRENCE&MORRISON, supra note 6, at 4²5 (“Nomenclature”).
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2018, the Trump administration issued a correction on an offi-
cial Pentagon report after labeling Taiwan as part of the PRC.
28
In July 2017 the White House identified Xi Jinping as the Pres-
ident of the “Republic of China.”
29
In 2006, the Bush administra-
tion introduced the PRC’s national anthem as that of the “Re-
public of China.”
30
The Republic of China (ROC) is the official
name of the state that was established in 1912 after the last em-
peror of China’s Qing Dynasty fell.
31
Years in Taiwan are still
counted from this date such that 2019 is year 108. At the time of
the ROC’s founding, the island of Taiwan was under Japanese
colonial rule, having been transferred following the Sino-Japa-
nese War.
32
Japanese rule extended until its defeat in World
War II.
33
The end of World War II did not cease hostilities in China. The
ROC government³under the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or
KMT)³and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had at times
worked together against the Japanese in the-enemy-of-my-en-
emy-is-my-friend fashion. This at best wary cooperation gave
way to a civil war that resulted in the KMT fleeing to the island
of Taiwan and to Mao Zedong proclaiming the establishment of
the PRC on October 1, 1949. This physical division of territorial
control persists.
The PRC government based in Beijing controls all of mainland
China along with Hainan, several smaller islands, Hong Kong
28. See Anthony Tao, Pentagon Issues Correction After Document Labels
Taiwan as Part of China, SUPCHINA (Feb. 5, 2018), http://sup-
china.com/2018/02/05/pentagon-issues-correction-after-document-labels-tai-
wan-as-part-of-china/.
29. See Tom Phillips, Wrong China Policy: White House Calls Xi Jinping
President of Taiwan, GUARDIAN (July 9, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/us-news/2017/jul/09/wrong-china-policy-white-house-calls-xi-jinping-
president-of-taiwan.
30. See Joseph Kahn, In Hu’s Visit to the U.S., Small Gaffes May Over-
shadow Small Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2006), http://www.ny-
times.com/2006/04/22/world/asia/22china.html.
31. Richard C. Bush, The Republic of China in Historical Perspective,
BROOKINGS (June 24, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-re-
public-of-china-in-historical-perspective/.
32. For a condensed timeline of Taiwan’s history, see Taiwan Profile – Time-
line, BBC (Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16178545.
33. See LO, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining purpose of Japanese policy to-
ward the colony of Taiwan as “to weaken the Taiwanese people’s consciousness
about their identity”).
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since 1997, andMacau since 1999.
34
The ROC government based
in Taipei controls the island of Taiwan along with surrounding
islands and the more distant Kinmen archipelago, portions of
which are “barely more than a mile” from the mainland shore.
35
The KMT government originally relocated to Taiwan with the
stated purpose of using it as a base to retake the mainland,
36
a
goal that has been abandoned by all but a tiny fringe of people
in Taiwan.
37
Today, the ROC flag adopted in 1921 still flies above
the President’s office in Taipei,
38
and the official ROC seal from
1929 is still used to authenticate official documents.
39
Over the
years, however, the use of “Taiwan” has come to dominate.
Sometimes phrasing is combined: for example, the “Republic of
China (Taiwan)” is used when signing certain international
agreements.
40
Sometimes the “ROC” drops out entirely, with
even the official government website using the uniform resource
locator www.taiwan.gov.tw/ without an “ROC” to be found. The
official English introduction of President Tsai uses the word
“Taiwan” ten times but “Republic of China” does not appear at
34. See Making Memories, ECONOMIST (Aug. 12, 1999), https://www.econo-
mist.com/node/ 232334.
35. Alan Taylor, Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands, Only a Few Miles from Main-
land China, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlan-
tic.com/photo/2015/10/taiwans-kinmen-islands-only-a-few-miles-from-main-
land-china/409720/ (noting that the island of Taiwan itself “lies about 100
miles (161 kilometers) east of mainland China”).
36. See SHELLEY RIGGER, WHY TAIWAN MATTERS: SMALL ISLAND, GLOBAL
POWERHOUSE 28 (2014).
37. Taiwan’s government ended the National Unification Council and sup-
porting Guidelines for National Unification in 2006. See Taiwan Scraps Unifi-
cation Council, BBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pa-
cific/4753974.stm; ZHONGHUA MINGUO (中華民國) [REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(TAIWAN)], GUOJIA TONGYI WEIYUANHUI (國家統一委員會) [NATIONAL
UNIFICATION COUNCIL], GUOJIA TONGYI GANGLING (國家統一綱領) [GUIDELINES
FORNATIONALUNIFICATION] (1991), translated in Guidelines for National Uni-
fication, WASH.U., http://collection.law.wustl.edu/Chinalaw/twguide.html (last
visited June 19, 2019).
38. See National Flag, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/96 (last visited May 23, 2019).
39. See National Symbols, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/99 (last visited May 23, 2019).
40. See, e.g., Republic of China (Taiwan) Signs Fisheries Agreement with
Japan, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 15, 2014),
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?
n=1eaddcfd4c6ec567&s=d879e042d13f9135.
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all.
41
Put simply, the de facto name is “Taiwan” with “Republic
of China” relegated to limited use in specific contexts.
How foreign governments and international organizations
view Taiwan is fraught. The PRC government sees Taiwan as
part of its territory and the ROC as a historical state that ceased
to exist upon founding of the PRC.
42
Sixteen countries have for-
mal diplomatic relations with the ROC, down from twenty-one
countries when President Tsai took office in 2016.
43
The Holy
See (Vatican) also recognizes the ROC,
44
though there are signs
that the Vatican’s support is wavering.
45
The United States
shifted official diplomatic relations from the ROC to the PRC on
January 1, 1979, but maintains a close unofficial relationship
with Taiwan.
46
The United States’ “One China Policy”³not to be
confused with the PRC’s “One China Principle”
47
³stands for the
position that “the issues between Beijing and Taiwan must be
resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Tai-
wan.”
48
41. President & Vice President, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REP. OF CHINA
(TAIWAN), https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/40 (last visited May 23, 2019).
42. See TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE & INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE
COUNCIL, THE ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE (Feb. 2000), avail-
able at http://en.people.cn/features/taiwanpaper/taiwan.html; see also Chun-I
Chen, Legal Aspects of Mutual Non-Denial and the Relations Across the Tai-
wan Straits, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 111, 113²16 (2012).
43. Lawrence Chung, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen Heads to Latin
America to Shore Up Diplomatic Ties, S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.) (Aug. 10,
2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti-
cle/2158821/taiwanese-president-tsai-ing-wen-heads-latin-america (reporting
twenty-two allies including the Holy See).
44. MINISTRY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS, supra note 3.
45. See, e.g., Shannon Tiezzi, Is Taiwan About to Lose Another Diplomatic
Ally?, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 1, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/is-taiwan-
about-to-lose-another-diplomatic-ally/.
46. See Jacques deLisle, The 40th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act,
TAIWAN INSIGHT (Mar. 18, 2019), https://taiwaninsight.org/2019/03/18/the-
40th-anniversary-of-the-taiwan-relations-act/ (“[T]he [Taiwan Relations Act]
has provided functional replacements for what Taipei lost when Washington
ended formal ties and the security pact in 1979.”); LAWRENCE&MORRISON, su-
pra note 6, at 7²12 (“Long-standing U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan”).
47. See STATE COUNCILWHITE PAPER, supra note 4.
48. Richard C. Bush, An Open Letter to Donald Trump on the One-China
Policy, BROOKINGS (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2016/12/13/an-open-letter-to-donald-trump-on-the-one-china-policy/
(quoting President Bill Clinton’s statement in May 2000) (italics omitted); see
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The U.S. government presence in Taiwan is through the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which is partially staffed by ca-
reer diplomats and serves functions like issuing visas and
providing U.S.-citizen services as an embassy would.
49
The open-
ing of a substantial new AIT compound in Taipei in June 2018
reinforced both physical similarities to U.S. embassies and oper-
ational similarities to how the United States conducts formal
diplomatic relations with countries around the world.
50
Taiwan,
in turn, has the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative
Office (TECRO) in the United States.
51
Taiwan’s unusual status also complicates its participation in
international organizations,
52
particularly as Beijing has in-
creased pressure to reduce Taiwan’s “international space.”
53
The
ROC lost its seat in the United Nations in 1971,
54
is unable to
have its representatives participate in UN activities,
55
and has
its citizens rebuffed when attempting to enter UN buildings us-
ing their ROC passports.
56
Taiwan is limited to using special ter-
also Richard C. Bush, A One China Policy Primer, BROOKINGS (Mar. 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/.
49. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN, https://www.ait.org.tw; see also
LAWRENCE&MORRISON, supra note 6, at 15²17.
50. Cf. Rebecca Tan, The U.S. Government Has Opened a Huge New Facility
in Taiwan, and China Isn’t Happy, WASH. POST (June 18, 2018),
https://wapo.st/2X6GpQn (“¶I offer you this [building], a tangible symbol that
the United States is here to stay,’ said Kin Moy, the AIT’s director and a long-
time American diplomat.”).
51. See ROC Embassies and Missions Abroad, TAIWAN EMBASSY,
https://www.taiwanembassy.org/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
52. See generally Pasha L. Hsieh, The Discipline of International Law in
Republican China and Contemporary Taiwan, 14 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 87 (2015); Pasha L. Hsieh, An Unrecognized State in Foreign and Inter-
national Courts: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 28 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 765 (2007).
53. J. Michael Cole, How to Wage the Battle for Taiwan’s International
Space, TAIWAN SENTINEL (May 4, 2017), https://sentinel.tw/battle-taiwans-intl-
space/.
54. G.A. Res. 2758, Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic
of China in the United Nations (Oct. 25, 1971).
55. See Chris Horton, As U.N. Gathers, Taiwan, Frozen Out, Struggles to
Get Noticed, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/09/21/world/asia/taiwan-united-nations-joseph-wu.html.
56. See, e.g., Elson Tong, Not Just Officials: Taiwan Students Blocked from
Visiting UN Public Gallery in Geneva, H.K. FREE PRESS (June 15, 2017),
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minology when participating in the few international organiza-
tions that allow its presence, such as “Chinese Taipei” for the





with a referendum failing to pass in November 2018 that asked
“whether Taiwan should compete at international sporting
events under that name, rather than ¶Chinese Taipei.’”
59
Domestically, Taiwan has undergone a radical political shift
since the KMT moved the ROC capitol to Taipei in the late
1940s. Taiwan was for decades a fierce dictatorship with Gener-
alissimo Chiang Kai-shek persecuting those who dared to ques-
tion the KMT’s lock on power.
60
Martial law was not lifted until
1987 under Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo.
61
The ROC held its
first direct presidential election in 1996, with the KMT candi-
date, Lee Teng-hui, winning.
62
The Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won the presidency in
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/06/15/not-just-officials-taiwan-students-
blocked-visiting-un-public-gallery-geneva/.
57. Member Economies, APEC, https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-
APEC/Member-Economies (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
58. Chen Wei-han, Push to Change Team Name for Olympics, TAIPEI TIMES
(Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar-
chives/2018/01/16/2003685849.
59. See Chris Horton, As China Rattles Its Sword, Taiwanese Push a Sepa-
rate Identity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/10/26/world/asia/taiwan-name-republic-of-china.html [herein-
after Horton, As China Rattles Its Sword, Taiwanese Push a Separate Identity];
see also Elizabeth Hsu, Referendum on Changing Sports Team Name to ‘Tai-
wan’ Rejected, FOCUS TAIWAN (Nov. 25, 2018), http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aeas/201811250008.aspx.
60. See Edwin A. Winckler, Institutionalization and Participation on Tai-
wan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?, 99 CHINA Q. 481, 491 (1984).
61. See LINDA CHAO & RAMON H. MYERS, THE FIRST CHINESE DEMOCRACY:
POLITICAL LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN 149 (1998) (“On July 14
[1987], President Chiang Ching-kuo issued a special decree that at zero hour
martial law should be lifted; on July 15 martial law ended.”). It is undisputed
that martial law was lifted while Chiang Ching-kuo was ROC President, but
the significance of his role in Taiwan’s democratization is subject to debate.
Compare Shelley Rigger, Studies on Taiwan’s Democracy and Democratiza-
tion, 1 INT’L J. TAIWAN STUDIES 141, 144 (2018) (disagreeing with efforts “to
write President Chiang Ching-kuo out of Taiwan’s democratization history”)
with J. Bruce Jacobs,Myth and Reality in Taiwan’s Democratisation, 43 ASIAN
STUD. REV. 164, 165 (2019) (refuting claims that “Chiang Ching-kuo estab-
lished democracy in Taiwan”).
62. See Taiwan’s Democratic Election (Opinion), N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/opinion/taiwan-s-democratic-elec-
tion.html.
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2000.
63
Power shifted back to the KMT in 2008 with the election
of President Ma Ying-jeou.
64
The election of President Tsai in
2016 marked a third peaceful transition of power, a step beyond
the “two-turnover test” of new democracies.
65
At the time of writ-
ing, Taiwan was gearing up for its next presidential election in
January 2020 with a host of contenders vying to unseat Presi-
dent Tsai.
66
Taiwan’s democracy is imperfect,
67
and the legacy of the au-
thoritarian past is still felt, but deep divisions between themain-
landers who arrived in the 1940s and the then existing popula-
tion have diminished dramatically.
68
There are now approxi-
mately 23.5 million ROC citizens who, when in Taiwan, enjoy
robust protection of civil and political rights, as demonstrated by
a score of 93 out of 100 on Freedom House’s 2019 scorecard of
Freedom in the World.
69
When traveling internationally, they
hold passports that have both “Republic of China” and “Taiwan”
63. See Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, How Chen Shui-bian Won: The 2004 Tai-
wan Presidential Election and Its Implications, 7 J. INT’L SEC. AFF. 33, 33²34
(2004).
64. See Edward Cody, Taiwan Voters Elect New President, WASH. POST
(Mar. 23, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2008/03/22/AR2008032200 442.html.
65. Cf. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRDWAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETHCENTURY 267 (1991) (“The party or group that takes power in
the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and
turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then
peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.”).
66. See Rigger, Taiwan on (the) Edge, supra note 20 (explaining contenders
“as Taiwan’s political parties battle over their presidential nominations”).
67. See Julian Baum&Gerrit van der Wees, Taiwan’s Imperfect Democracy,
DIPLOMAT (Feb. 7, 2012), https://thediplomat.com/2012/02/taiwans-imperfect-
democracy/.
68. See, e.g., Paul R. Katz, Trauma and Memory — 228 in Taiwan Today,
CHINA BEAT (Mar. 2, 2008), http://thechinabeat.blogspot.com/2008/03/trauma-
and-memory-228-in-taiwan-today.html.
69. See Freedom in the World 2019: Taiwan, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://free-
domhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/taiwan (last visited May 24, 2019)
(rating Taiwan as 93 out of 100, with 100 being the “Most Free”). Taiwan’s
score has increased from 89 out of 100 in 2016. See Freedom in the World 2016:
Taiwan, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2016/Taiwan (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
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emblazoned on the cover.
70
The Republic of China lingers, but
Taiwan is now firmly in the forefront.
In sum, while there is general agreement that there is an is-
land named Taiwan, the status of that geographic feature and of
the people living on it and nearby islands remains subject to
highly politicized debate. The choice of terminology used to de-
scribe Taiwan conveys the speaker’s political views.
71
Likewise,
referring to the land across the Taiwan Strait as “China” as com-
pared with “mainland China” carries political connotations, as
does use of “unification” versus “re-unification” in English for the
Chinese word tongyi (with the latter implying that Taiwan and
the PRC³not just a broader conception of “China”³were once a
combined entity).
72
Daily life goes on against this complicated
backdrop: people seek to enter into business transactions and
settle disputes, obtain justice when harmed by others, buy prop-
erty, get married and perhaps divorced, and otherwise organize
society’s interactions. The next Part turns to how the legal sys-
tem that governs these interactions has developed.
II. HISTORICALDEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN TAIWAN
In some ways Taiwan has a long legal history. The founda-
tional ROC laws were drawn up nearly a century ago with influ-
ence from Qing Dynasty legal codes.
73
At that time, the island of
70. See ROC Passport Places 32nd in Global Rankings by UK Advisory
Firm, TAIWAN TODAY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://taiwan-
today.tw/news.php?unit=10&post=127794; see also Apply for a Passport,
BUREAU OFCONSULARAFF., MINISTRY OF FOREIGNAFF., REP. OFCHINA (TAIWAN)
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.boca.gov.tw/cp-139-462-c06c9-2.html. Travel to
the PRC is done under sui generis procedures. See Mainland Removes Entry
Permit Requirements for Taiwan Residents, CHINA DAILY (June 18, 2016),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/18/content_21039772.htm.
71. This has become an issue for companies, not just individuals, with Bei-
jing pressuring changes regarding how Taiwan is identified. See, e.g., Emily
Feng & Edward White, China Reprimands Companies Calling Taiwan and Ti-
bet Independent, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/3f88cbba-f9b5-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167.
72. See Jenna Lynn Cody, Lost in Translation: How Language is Used to
Obfuscate Taiwan’s Reality, MEDIUM (Mar. 9, 2019), https://medium.com/amer-
ican-citizens-for-taiwan/lost-in-translation-how-language-is-used-to-obfus-
cate-taiwans-reality-5b0d11a1a844 (noting that the PRC “does promote the
use of ¶reunification’ over ¶unification’ to describe 統一 (tǒng yū)”).
73. SeeWang, supra note 9, at 14 (“清朝統治下傳統中國法當道”).
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Taiwan was subject to laws imposed by Japan as part of its colo-
nial rule, and the influence of this period still lingers today.
74
Law in Taiwan is also young.
75
Martial law was lifted only
three decades ago, and criminal justice in particular has under-
gone seismic reforms in the intervening years. There are vibrant
debates within Taiwan regarding legal reforms, as well as con-
versations that span jurisdictions, most prominently connecting
domestic developments to those seen in its East Asian neighbors
of South Korea and Japan.
76
Throughout Taiwan’s democratic
transition, there has continuously been a structured system of
laws that governs life of people living there. People may disagree
about the nature of the legal system applicable to Taiwan today,
but it is uncontroversial that there are well-established laws and
institutions in place that help order society.
77
The 1947 ROC Constitution, as amended multiple times,
78
re-
mains the foundation of the legal system.
79
It established a five-
74. Id.
75. For example, a 2017 conference celebrating the work of Prof. Wang Tay-
sheng was titled “Twenty Years of Taiwan’s Legal History” (“台灣法律史二十
年”), emphasizing the dramatic changes in recent decades. International Sym-
posium on the Past, Present, and Future of Taiwan Legal History, Institutum
Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica (Nov. 30²Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with author).
76. See generally Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of
East Asian Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805,
822 (2011) (positing that “the constitutional experiences in East Asia have de-
veloped into a distinctive model that is not included in existing constitutional
theories”).
77. Indeed, much of this Article was written in the library of one of those
institutions: the Judicial Yuan’s Judges Academy (法官學院), and for their hos-
pitality I am grateful. FAGUANXUEYUAN (法官學院) [JUD. YUAN’SJUDGESACAD.],
http://tpi.judicial.gov.tw/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
78. The Constitution was most recently amended in 2005. See MINGUO
XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] (1947) (Taiwan) [hereinafter 1947 ROC Constitution];
see also Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan), OFF.OF THEPRESIDENT,
REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN), http://english.president.gov.tw/Page/93. Tsung-fu
Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan, in THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM
THEPACIFICRIM 107, 109 (2000), available at http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/pro-
grams/program_pdfs/compendium.pdf [hereinafter Chen, The Rule of Law in
Taiwan] (explaining that the ROC constitution “was repeatedly and exten-
sively amended in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999 and 2000, effectively resulting
in a new constitution”).
79. See 1947 ROC Constitution, supra note 78; cf. Joseph Raz, On the Au-
thority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152²93 (Larry Alexander
ed., 1998) (exploring role of constitutions in creating stable legal systems). Alt-
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branch (or “Yuan” in Chinese) system of government with an Ex-
amination Yuan (in charge of examining and managing civil
servants) and Control Yuan (an ombudsman-type role) joining
the more standard tripartite structure of executive, legislative,
and judicial branches.
80
The ROC’s early emphasis on legal codes
drew heavily on the Continental European civil-law model.
81
These foundational laws have over the years been supplemented
by an extensive web of subsidiary laws and regulations. The
ROC legal system replaced Japanese colonial laws in Taiwan af-
ter World War II,
82
though the influence of Japan’s legal system
continues with many Taiwanese scholars having received train-
ing in Japan and proposed legal reforms, like lay participation
in criminal trials, drawing on Japan’s experience.
83
Decades of martial law followed the colonial Japanese period.
84
With the legal system firmly under KMT control, prosecutors
and judges were largely instruments of repression rather than
of rights vindication.
85
The KMT used a variety of legal and ex-
tralegal measures to silence dissent, even reaching abroad. The
New York Times reported in 1984 that the murder in San Fran-
cisco of Taiwanese dissident Henry Liu “stirred widespread fear
among Chinese intellectuals in the United States that they may
hough the 1947 ROC Constitution was in effect during martial law, the Tem-
porary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion consol-
idated power in the president’s hands. See, e.g., DENNY ROY, TAIWAN: A
POLITICALHISTORY (2003).
80. Political System, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_4.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
81. SeeWeitseng Chen, Twins of Opposites: Why China Will Not Follow Tai-
wan’s Model of Rule of Law Transition Toward Democracy, 66 AM. J. COMP. L.
481, 517²18 (2018) [hereinafter Chen, Twins of Opposites] (explaining that the
legal system established by the KMT prior to move to Taiwan was “one mod-
eled on continental law systems in Europe, especially Germany”).
82. See generally Tay-sheng Wang, Translation, Codification, and Trans-
plantation of Foreign Laws in Taiwan, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 307 (2016) [herein-
after Wang, Translation, Codification, and Transplantation of Foreign Laws
in Taiwan].
83. For a discussion of the significant influence of Japan on Taiwan’s legal
development see TAY-SHENGWANG, LEGAL REFORM IN TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE
COLONIAL RULE, 1895²1945: THERECEPTION OFWESTERN LAW (2000).
84. See Lung-sheng Tao, Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist
China, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 753 (1971).
85. See Tay-shengWang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Cen-
tury: Toward a Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531,
554 (2002) (“In the context of authoritarian rule, the KMT judicial authorities
usually paid limited attention to the dignity or human rights of the accused.”).
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be in danger.”
86
The perpetrators were ultimately convicted in
Taiwan, and the case helped to accelerate momentum for the end
of authoritarian rule.
87
Pockets of resistance had begun to gain traction in the 1970s,
but at great personal costs to the pro-democracy activists.
88
A
number of government critics were legally trained, including re-
cipients of degrees from prestigious American law schools. For
example, Yeh Jiunn-rong³the formerMinister of Education and
Minister of the Interior, as well as renowned constitutional law
scholar³recalled that, while studying law at Yale in 1987, he
received a “request[] by a lawyer friend to cast a vote from
abroad in order to get the desired ¶regime change’ in the Taipei
Bar Association that had long been controlled by lawyers of mil-
itary origin.”
89
Soon after Lu Hsiu-lien returned to Taiwan in the
late 1970s with a Harvard law degree, she was imprisoned for
over five years because of her pro-democracy activities.
90
Such
efforts of the dangwai (literally “outside the party [KMT]”)
86. Fox Butterfield, Death of Critic of Taiwan Leader Stirs Fear Among Chi-
nese in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 1984), https://www.ny-
times.com/1984/11/02/us/death-of-critic-of-taiwan-leader-stirs-fear-among-
chinese-in-us.html; see also Taiwan Murderer Changes Her Story, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/05/11/world/taiwan-murderer-
changes-his-story.html (reporting on case of murdered Taiwanese dissident
Henry Liu who was shot in California).
87. See John Pomfret, Could Khashoggi’s Death Trigger Reforms? A 1984
Murder Case Offers Lessons, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/22/could-khashoggis-death-trig-
ger-reforms-a-1984-murder-case-offers-lessons/?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.2e472e307284 (noting that then President Chiang Ching-
kuo’s “advisers used the incident to push for political reform”).
88. See, e.g., Jane Kaufman Winn & Tang-chi Yeh, Advocating Democracy:
The Role of Lawyers in Taiwan’s Political Transformation, 20 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 561, 592²94 (1995) (explaining government crackdown following the
1979 Kaohsiung incident, in which activists staged pro-democracy demonstra-
tions).
89. Jiunn-rong Yeh, Taiwan’s Transitional Constitutionalism, Address Be-
fore the University of Wisconsin School of Law Conference: Law and Democra-
tization in Taiwan and Korea: Twenty Years’ Experience (Oct. 19²20, 2007),
https://perma.cc/YQ4C-P62P. For the role of lawyers in Taiwan’s democratic
transition see Chen, Twins of Opposites, supra note 81, at 520²23.
90. See generally HSIU-LIENLU, MYFIGHT FOR ANEWTAIWAN (2014); see also
Emily Newburger, The Rivals, HARV. L. BULL. (July 23, 2006), https://to-
day.law.harvard.edu/feature/the-rivals/ (retelling the experiences of Lu Hsiu-
lien and Ma Ying-jeou who were classmates at Harvard).
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movement of the 1970s laid the basis for the DPP,
91
now one of
Taiwan’s two main political parties. Lu Hsiu-lien went on to be-
come Vice President under the first President from the DPP,
Chen Shui-bian.
Democratization in the 1990s brought profound changes to
people’s civil and political rights, but the legal system was struc-
turally still closely tied to the long-standing ROC codes.
92
Re-
form efforts gained traction and culminated in the 1999 National
Judicial Reform Conference (“1999 Reform Conference”).
93
The
overall exercise at the 1999 Reform Conference was a conversa-
tion among legal experts, many of whom had received graduate
training in Germany, Japan, or the United States.
94
Affinity
groupings based on legal training remain powerful to this day,
95
though they are far from the sole defining characteristic of ex-
perts’ views. Nonetheless, the desire to transplant aspects of the
foreign systems with which various experts were familiar³and
the tension among different approaches³was an overarching
theme of legal reforms in the late 1990s. A key decision was to
move away from the existing practice of deciding cases based
predominantly on the case file and towards a “reformed adver-
sarial system.”
96
The envisioned system would place greater em-
phasis on the presentation of evidence, including witnesses, at
trial, but retain the past practice of transferring the entire case
91. See Albert H.Y. Chen, A Tale of Two Islands: Comparative Reflections
on Constitutionalism in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 37 H.K. L.J. 647, 666 (2007)
(describing formation of DPP).
92. See generally TAY-SHENGWANG, THE PROCESS OF LEGALMODERNIZATION
INTAIWAN (2015). For historical context, see also Tao, supra note 84, at 750²51
(describing legal developments under the KMT).
93. See Legis. Yuan, 5th Term, 2d Sess., 17th Meeting Rec., 92 LEGIS. YUAN
GAZ., 1823²27 (2003) (Taiwan) (reporting Judicial Affairs Committee’s discus-
sions of the 1999 conference).
94. See Wang, Translation, Codification, and Transplantation of Foreign
Laws in Taiwan, supra note 82, at 319²20.
95. See Chang, supra note 11, at 97.
96. See Jaw-perng Wang, The Great Leap in Taiwan’s Criminal Justice Re-
form, Address Before the Asian Law Institute Inaugural Conference: The Role
of Law in a Developing Asia (May 27²28, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Jaw-perng Wang, 2004 Address]; Gailiangshi Dangshiren Jinxing Zhuyi
(改良式當事人進行主義), JUD. YUAN (司法院) (Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/work/work02/work02-01.asp.
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file to judges pre-trial, with judges maintaining an investigatory
responsibility.
97
The “reformed adversarial system” was in theory meant to in-
corporate aspects of an American-style adversarial proceeding
while continuing the legal system’s continental European “in-
quisitorial” bent that was both built into the foundational ROC
legal codes and reflected in the laws brought over during the
Japanese colonial period.
98
The system further retained the ex-
isting practice of selecting judges and prosecutors through a uni-
fied “judicial officer” (“司法官”) civil-servant exam that was fol-
lowed by combined training before separation into two tracks.
99
Lawyers remained subject to a separate bar exam.
100
Decisions from the 1999 Reform Conference were partially in-
corporated into the Criminal Procedure Code. Thorough imple-
mentation of reforms was stymied in part by political divisions
between the DPP-controlled presidency and a strong KMT pres-
ence in the legislative and judicial branches.
101
The challenges
of changing an entrenched bureaucratic structure and ongoing
97. See generallyMargaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and
the Overlooked Challenge of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 651,
663²66 (2009).
98. See Yiwu Bianhu Zhuanqu (義務辯護專區) [Special Area of the Obliga-
tion to Defend], JUD. YUAN (司法院), http://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/work/work02/work02-30.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (describing
change from inquisitorial system to a reformed adversarial system); Cf.MIRJAN
R. DAMAäKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 3²6 (1986) (distin-
guishing between adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings as descendants of
historical systems as compared with using these terms as ideal types). Com-
parative law literature is rife with discussion of the challenges of successfully
using “legal transplants,” as seen in the 1999 reforms to criminal procedure in
Taiwan. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”, 4
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Trans-
plant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167 (2003) (classifying countries into
“those that developed their formal legal order internally (origins) and those
that received their formal legal order from other countries (transplants)”).
99. See Chang-fa Lo, Possible Reform for Legal Education in Taiwan: A Re-
fined “J.D. System”?, 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2006) [hereinafter Lo, Possible
Reform for Legal Education in Taiwan] (reporting pass rates in single digits).
100. See id.
101. Cf. Christopher R. Hughes, Challenges and Opportunities for Unifica-
tion After Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election, in CONTEMPORARY CHINA: THE
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE START OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 157 (Jürgen
Haacke & Peter W. Preston eds., 2002), available at
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/10699/ (explaining challenge that ongoing KMT politi-
cal strength posed to President Chen following the 2000 election).
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disagreements among legal experts as to whether the 1999 Re-
form Conference chose the best path for Taiwan further compli-
cated reforms.
102
Conversations regarding casting off vestiges of
the authoritarian past continued in the 2000s and culminated in
such measures as the repeal of a law that allowed secretive
quasi-criminal trials in so-called “hooligan” cases.
103
Protracted
debates regarding the organization of the legal system did not,
however, result in dramatic change with respect to the general
processes by which cases moved through the courts. In short,
there was tinkering, but no transformation.





took on a more high-
profile role in giving heft to rights that had been, at best, ne-





such as the 1997 stripping of prose-
cutors’ ability to summarily detain suspects without judicial ap-
proval.
108
In 2003, the presumption of innocence was made clear
102. See Jaw-perng Wang, 2004 Address, supra note 96.
103. See generally JEROME A. COHEN & MARGARET K. LEWIS, CHALLENGE TO
CHINA: HOWTAIWANABOLISHED ITSVERSION OFRE-EDUCATIONTHROUGHLABOR
(2013) (analyzing historical development and abolition of the law regarding
“hooligans” (“流氓”)).
104. See, e.g., Xingsu Zhidu Daxiu Zhangxian Renquan (刑訴制度大修彰顯人
權) [Overhaul of the Criminal Procedure System Manifests Human Rights],
CHINA TIMES (中國時報), Jan. 15, 2003, at 1 (reporting Criminal Procedure
Code revisions as demonstrating clear concern for human rights).
105. The大法官會議, literally “Council of Grand Justices,” interprets the con-
stitution and unifies the interpretation of laws. 1947 ROC Constitution, supra
note 78, art. 78. It is commonly referred to in English as the Constitutional
Court. See, e.g., Press Release, Republic of China (Taiwan), Constitutional
Court, Same Sex Marriage Case (May 24, 2017), available at http://jirs.judi-
cial.gov.tw/GNNWS/NNWSS002.asp?id=267570. For an excellent explanation
of how the ROC Constitution has changed over the years, see JIUNN-RONGYEH,
THECONSTITUTION OF TAIWAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2016).
106. See Margaret K. Lewis, Constitutions Across the Strait, in
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN CHINA’SHUMAN RIGHTS (Chen Dingding & Ti-
tus Chen eds., Routledge, 2015); Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan, supra note
78, at 110.
107. See Thomas Weishing Huang, Judicial Activism in the Transitional Pol-
ity: The Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan, 19 TEMP. INT’L&COMP. L.J. 1, 4
(2005) (explaining judiciary’s “gradual expansion of power” after the end of
martial law).
108. SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI (司法院大法官會議) [COUNCIL OF GRAND
JUSTICES], INTERPRETATIONNO. 392 (Dec. 22, 1995), available at http://www.ju-
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in the Criminal Procedure Code.
109
The other branches of gov-
ernment have likewise supported human rights norms since the
lifting of martial law. In 2009, then President Ma signed the rat-
ification instruments of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
110
Taiwan could
not actually deposit those instruments due to its international
status. Instead, the legislature incorporated the contents of the
two covenants into domestic law.
111
Enhancing human rights has been a major thread running
through legal reform discussions. There have simultaneously
been calls for a stronger response to crime. Judges have been
criticized for being too lenient in sentencing, especially in cases
involving children and other sympathetic victims. Taiwan’s re-
tention of the death penalty is tied to these sentiments,
112
as is
periodic proposed legislation with a zealous anti-crime bent.
These include failed bills that would have required the death
penalty in certain cases with a child victim
113
and allowed cor-
poral punishment for drunk driving.
114
dicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=392 (requiring legisla-
ture to revise the Criminal Procedure Code within two years, which revisions
were carried out in 1997).
109. Xingshi Susong Fa (刑事訴訟法) [Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 154
(Taiwan) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure Code], available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=C0010001.
110. See generally Mark L. Shope, The Adoption and Function of Interna-
tional Instruments: Thoughts on Taiwan’s Enactment of the Act to Implement
the ICCPR and the ICESCR, 22 IND. INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 159 (2012).
111. See Yu-jie Chen, Socialization in Isolation: Taiwan’s Practice of Human
Rights Treaties as a Non-UNMember State (2016) (unpublished J.S.D. disser-
tation, New York University School of Law) (on-file with author) [hereinafter
Chen, Socialization in Isolation].
112. Cf. Fort Fu-Te Liao, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Taiwan: Why
a De Facto Moratorium was Established and Lost, 11 ASIA-PAC. J. HUM. RTS. &
L. 1 (2010).
113. See Wang Yumin Ti An Sha Tong Pan Sixing Fayu Bu: Buyi (王育敏提
案殺童判死刑 法務部：不宜) [Wang Yumin Proposes Bill That Would Sentence
Child Killers to Death – Ministry of Justice: Inappropriate], APPLEDAILY (蘋果
日報) (Mar. 30, 2016), www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/arti-
cle/new/20160330/827986/.
114. See Zheng Zhonglan (政仲嵐), Taiwan Dizhi Jiujia yu Xing Qin: Xiang
Yinjin Bian Xing Shi Haoshi Ma? (台灣抵制酒駕與性侵：想引進鞭刑是好事嗎?)
[Taiwan Resists Drunk Driving and Sexual Assault: Is It a Good Idea to Intro-
duceWhipping?], BBC (Nov. 24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chi-
nese-news-42105946.
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Whether the criticism be that the government is too weak in
protecting human rights or too weak in striking at crime, both
views are tied to negative perceptions of the legal system.
Judges, in particular, have been singled out as unresponsive to
the concerns of contemporary society. The conviction of a small
number of judges on corruption charges created ripple effects of
tarnishing the broader judiciary and bolstering fears that ves-
tiges of the authoritarian era remain.
115
The government has
also struggled to communicate legal reforms to the public. For
example, “reformed adversarial system,” which is a cumbersome
phrase in Chinese (改良式當事人進行主義), is not a catchy slo-
gan. It is with this backdrop of a zeitgeist of dissatisfaction that
President Tsai took office in 2016.
III. NEWDEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN’S LEGAL IDENTITY
President Tsai gave a renewed push to protracted debates re-
garding legal reforms. In her May 2016 inaugural remarks, she
highlighted “social fairness and justice” as a key area for her ad-
ministration to address and cautioned that people feel the cur-
rent judicial system
116
is unable to fight crime effectively:
117
“The
judicial system must respond to the needs of the people. It will
no longer be a judicial system for legal professionals only, but for
everyone. Judicial reform is not only the business of legal pro-
fessionals; it must be inclusive. These are my expectations for
judicial reform.”
118
She announced her intention to convene a
conference to address these issues. The National Affairs Confer-
ence on Judicial Reform (司法改革國是會議) (the “2017 Reform
Conference”) kicked off in November 2016 but held the bulk of
115. See Corrupt Judges Handed Lengthy Prison Sentences, TAIPEI TIMES
(July 1, 2011), http://www.ta ipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ar-
chives/2011/07/01/2003507146.
116. Though often termed as “judicial” reform, debate extends beyond judges
to include the work of police, prosecutors, and other actors in the legal system.
Judges receive disproportionate emphasis but are not the exclusive subject of
the debate.
117. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), Zongtong Jiu Zhi Yan Shuo (總統就職演說) [Inau-
gural Address] (May 20, 2016) (Taiwan), translated in Full Text of President
Tsai’s Inaugural Address, FOCUS TAIWAN (May 20, 2016), http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605200008.aspx (“社會的公平與正義” [social fair-
ness and justice] and “司法無法有效打擊犯罪” [judicial system is unable to fight
crime effectively]).
118. Id.
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meetings from spring 2017 until its conclusion in August
2017.
119
This Part argues that transparency (Part III.A), clarity (Part
III.B), and participation (Part III.C) are emerging as animating
principles of Taiwan’s legal system. They both are infused into
the process of legal reform debates and are starting to be embed-
ded in the substance of the reforms themselves. Though the con-
versation is not explicitly structured around these three themes,
they encapsulate the many initiatives falling under the over-
arching goal of reducing the gap between the public and the legal
system.
120
These themes have also run through the author’s
many conversations with people in Taiwan, both those working
inside and outside the legal system.
121
Changing a legal system is a complicated, messy process. This
is true in Taiwan as in other jurisdictions. One challenge is that
greater public involvement can be an unsettling disruption to
long-entrenched bureaucratic norms. That said, judges, prosecu-
tors, and other actors in the legal system are beleaguered by the
lack of trust in their work: adjusting their established routines
is a price many, though not necessarily all, will pay in order to
boost morale. In June 2017, Former Vice President of the Judi-
cial Yuan, Su Yeong-chin, wrote that he was happy about Presi-
dent Tsai’s emphasis on looking at legal issues from the people’s
perspective instead of just focusing on elites.
122
119. See President Tsai Launches Judicial Reform in Taiwan, TAIWANTODAY
(July 12, 2016), http://taiwan-
today.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=3923; Fenzu Huiyi Jilu (分組會議
紀錄) [Record of Sub-Committee Meetings], SIFA GAIGE GUO SHI HUIYI (司法改
革國是會議) [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON JUD. REFORM], https://justice.presi-
dent.gov.tw/meetings/2 (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (listing meeting dates).
120. See, e.g., Si: Canyu, Touming, Qinjin de Sifa (四：參與、透明、親近的司
法) [Four: Participation, Transparency, Close Justice], JUD. REFORMFOUND. (財
團法人民間司法改革基金會), https://www.jrf.org.tw/keywords/73 (last visited
Apr. 24, 2019).
121. Cf. James Q. Whitman, The Hunt for the Truth in Comparative Law, 65
AM. J. COMP. L. 181, 189 (2017) (“There is no way to understand an alien cul-
ture without throwing oneself into it. But that does not mean that individual
empathetic interpretations are purely arbitrary. There is a test of the truth of
what the individual scholar says: That test is whether his descriptions seem
right and plausible to others who know the cultures he describes, and whether
they seem to make sense of what would otherwise be confusing phenomena.”).
122. Su Yongqin (蘇永欽), Mingjia Zonglun / Su Yongqin: Si Gai de
Hongguan Siwei (名家縱論／蘇永欽：司改的宏觀思維) [Su Yeong-chin Dis-
cusses: Overarching Thinking Behind Judicial Reforms], UDNNEWS（聯合新
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The potential political gains from sympathizing with public
dissatisfaction even if ultimately little changes in practice has
prompted doubts about the sincerity of government rhetoric.
123
In the run-up to the 2016 elections, then candidate Tsai Ing-wen
navigated tricky political waters in building support for her
presidential bid.
124
As President Tsai now looks ahead to a
highly uncertain 2020 election, she faces criticism on a number
of fronts ranging from domestic economic policies to cross-strait
relations.
125
The first execution carried out during Tsai’s presi-
dency in August 2018 raised questions about her commitment to
human rights and legal reforms in the face of popular pres-
sures.
126
She has to decide how to build and then spend her po-
litical capital. It is entirely possible that the debates about how
to reform legal institutions will be more bluster than substance,
fading from the spotlight before systemic changes take hold and
leaving underlying issues to be rehashed at another judicial re-
form conference years down the road. Yet this Article argues
that it would be a mistake to quickly brush aside the current
reform debate as mere political posturing. There is a concerted
effort³even if some actors might be motivated by political expe-
diency³to make the legal system less rarefied and distant. This
聞網） (June 25, 2017), https://udn.com/news/story/7339/2544732 (comments
by former Vice President of the Judicial Yuan: “我特別高興聽到蔡總統開始強調
要從人民的角度看司法問題，而不是問法律菁英有什麼問題”).
123. See, e.g., Jason Pan, Campaigners Advocating Jury Trial System Protest
at Presidential Office, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.taipei-
times.com/News/front/archives /2017/02/25/2003665660.
124. See generally Lev Nachman, Misalignment Between Social Movements
and Political Parties in Taiwan’s 2016 Election, 58 ASIANSURV. 874 (2018) (ex-
plaining ideological tension between the DPP and leftist activists).
125. See Chris Horton, China and US Square Off in Taiwan’s Presidential
Race, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spot-
light/Asia-Insight/China-and-US-square-off-in-Taiwan-s-presidential-race; see
also Paul Huang, Polls Show Tsai Ing-wen’s Chances at Winning Re-Election
Are as Slim as Ever, NEWS LENS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://international.the-
newslens.com/feature/taiwan2020/115650.
126. See Taiwanese Man Executed for Killing Ex-Wife and Daughter in Is-
land’s First Capital Punishment for Two Years, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Sept.
1, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/2162318/taiwan-carries-out-
first-execution-two-years. See also Brian Hioe, Political Motivations for the Ex-
ecution of Subway Killer Cheng Chieh?, NEW BLOOM MAG. (May 12, 2016),
https://newbloommag.net/2016/05/12/cheng-chieh-execution/.
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push echoes experiences outside Taiwan in seeking broad legiti-
macy for legal norms.
127
It is also important to emphasize the long-simmering nature
of current reform efforts. The goal of increasing the public’s voice
in the legal system has accelerated under President Tsai but has
much deeper roots.
128
An initial step was to even get people to
use the courts: reforms in the 1990s, for example, sought to ex-
pand access to small claims courts such that “[t]he people are
encouraged to resolve their disputes in courts.”
129
Forging a new legal identity through a transparent, clear, and
participatory process also does not mean that the public has un-
til this point been passive.
130
Professor Yeh Jiunn-rong wrote in
2016 that “Taiwan has displayed a pattern of strong civic en-
gagement in support of constitutional reform, championing a
model of ¶civic constitutionalism’, beyond representative democ-
racy.”
131
Proponents of legal reforms have long used public
demonstrations to bring attention to the need for changes to the
system. Looking back to 1990, protestors in the Wild Lily Move-
ment included nullifying authoritarian-era laws and pursuing
constitutional reform among their key demands.
132
Today, it is a
regular occurrence for groups to openly protest government pol-
icies.
133
The most dramatic event in recent years was the 2014
“Sunflower Movement” during which demonstrators occupied
127. See generally Valerie P. Hans, Trial by Jury: Story of a Legal Trans-
plant, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 471, 484 (2017) (noting “some scholars argue that
citizens in a contemporary democratic society increasingly expect government
transparency and accountability”).
128. See Oscar Chung, Embodiments of Excellence?, FREE CHINA REV. (Tai-
wan), Aug. 1, 1998, at 12 (noting results of a 1998 government poll: “Only 52
percent of more than 1,000 persons polled thought that Taiwan’s judges were
reliable . . . and some 70 percent thought that judges were politically biased.”).
129. Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan, supra note 78, at 119.
130. Litigants have of course participated. Cf. Yun-Hsien Diana Lin, Civil
Mediation in Taiwan: Legal Culture and the Process of Legal Modernization, 6
E. ASIA L. REV. 191 (2011).
131. YEH, supra note 105, at 245.
132. See id. at 37²38; see also Relation to History in the Sunflower Movement,
DAYBREAK (July 24, 2017), https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/07/24/sun-
flower-history-past-movements/ (“[S]tudent movements as the Wild Lily Move-
ment have played a major historical role in the process of democratization . . .
.”).
133. See, e.g., Brian Hioe, Protests Against Labor Law Changes See Clashes
Not Seen Since Sunflower Movement, NEW BLOOM MAG. (Dec. 24, 2017),
https://newbloommag.net/2017/12/24/labor-protests-historic/.
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the legislature in protest of a trade pact with the PRC.
134
Public
opinion is also expressed through the legislature, which is se-
lected via democratic elections and must approve changes to
laws. As with any elected body, the legislators are aware of their
constituents’ views, which was evident during heated debates
leading up to the May 2019 legalization of same-sex marriage.
135
What we are seeing today is a shift from the protestors being
just outside the government’s door to instead gradually being let
into the room as part of the conversation. Giving greater voice to
the public in shaping legal reforms does not mean casting aside
legal expertise.
136
Judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and academics
remain at the core of Taiwan’s process of legal reform.
137
Their
contributions have been invaluable to shaping the legal system.
Unlike at the 1999 Reform Conference, however, they do not
have a “monopoly” on the conversation.
138
Rather than limiting
134. See generally Ming-sho Ho, Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Op-
portunity, Threat, and the Sunflower Movement, 15 J. E. ASIA STUD. 69 (2015),
available at http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~msho/book.files/J43.pdf (analyzing
“intra-elite divisions and the role of alliances with institutional actors as im-
portant determinants of protest success”).
135. See Nathan Batto, The Politics of the Marriage Equality Vote, FROZEN
GARLIC (May 21, 2019), https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2019/05/21/the-pol-
itics-of-the-marriage-equality-vote/ [hereinafter Batto, The Politics of the Mar-
riage Equality Vote] (detailed analysis of the politics behind the legislature’s
vote to legalize same-sex marriage); William Yang, Marriage Equality in Tai-
wan: Time to Re-Engage the Public, KETAGALAN MEDIA (Feb. 15, 2018),
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2018/02/15/marriage-equality-taiwan-time-
re-engage-public.
136. For a broader sociological discussion of the role of elite intellectualism,
and push-back against that tradition, in protests in Taiwan, see Ming-sho Ho,
A Revolt Against Chinese Intellectualism: Understanding the Protest Script in
Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement of 2014, MOBILIZING IDEAS (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2014/12/02/a-revolt-against-chinese-in-
tellectualism-understanding-the-protest-script-in-taiwans-sunflower-move-
ment-of-2014/ (“In place of the ultra-serious tone of Chinese intellectualism,
the Sunflower Movement incorporated many elements from the youth popular
culture.”). For a comparative perspective see Hans, supra note 127, at 473
(“Comparative law scholars point to the important roles legal elites play in the
movement of laws and legal institutions. . . .”).
137. Cf. Xingshi Susong Fa Daxiu 99 Tiao Shangsu Tiaojian Jiang Bian
Yange (刑事訴訟法大修99條 上訴條件將變嚴格) [Criminal Procedure Overhaul
of 99 Articles — Appeal Requirements Becoming More Strict], LIBERTY TIMES
(自由時報) (Jan. 30, 2018), http://m.ltn.com.tw/news/society/breaking-
news/2327253.
138. ZHONGHUAMINGUO (中華民國) [REPUBLIC OFCHINA (TAIWAN)], ZONGTONG
FU (總統府) [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT], SIFA GAIGE GUO SHIHUIYI CHENGGUO
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the legal system’s crafting to law-trained elites, there is growing
pressure to incorporate the broader public in an iterative process
of lawmaking involving ongoing interactions that gradually
move the system towards a norm equilibrium.
139
What that norm equilibrium might look like is subject to great
speculation. There are questions concerning what legal revisions
will be enacted, as well as the follow-on question of what changes
to the black-letter law will mean in the larger cultural context.
140
To the extent that incorporating new viewpoints is seen as a
means to an immediate end, then public involvement may not
become embedded into the ongoing functioning of the legal sys-
tem. Namely, the cynical view is that rhetoric of public involve-
ment is more for public relations then genuine reforms.
141
Even if reform efforts are sincere, the result might not be a
pronounced increase in long-term public involvement. It is pos-
sible that public dissatisfaction with the judiciary is more due to
the perception of judges’ work than actual disagreement with
that work. A public opinion poll conducted by the Judicial Yuan
found that a majority of respondents connected their negative
BAOGAO (司法改革國是會議成果報告) [NATIONAL AFFAIRS CONFERENCE ON
JUDICIAL REFORM REPORT] 8 (2017), available at http://www.presi-
dent.gov.tw/News/21581 [hereinafter 2017 Reform Conference Report] (differ-
entiating current reform effort with the “monopoly” (“獨攬”) by legal elites in
1999).
139. Cf. Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law:
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corpo-
rate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007) (establishing framework
of “the recursivity of law”).
140. Compare Pierre Legrand, Jameses at Play: A Tractation on the Compar-
ison of Laws, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 16 (2017) (for “culturalists” “the posited law
cannot be where comparison stops. Instead, it must be the springboard allow-
ing the comparison to begin its presencing.”) with Russell A. Miller, On Hostil-
ity and Hospitality: Othering Pierre Legrand, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 205²06
(2017) (responding to Legrand’s discussion regarding law’s cultural embed-
dedness and its connection to Derrida’s views on the “other” and the “self”).
141. See Wei Ke (威克), Ni Bu Gaoxing, Wo Ye Bu Manyi de Taiwan Sifa
Gaige (你不高興、我也不滿意的台灣司法改革) [You’re Not Happy, and I’m Not
Satisfied with Taiwan’s Judicial Reform], BBC (Aug. 16, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-40954039; For an airing of
various criticisms of the 2017 Reform Conference, see Hsin-po Huang & Jake
Chung, Second Judicial Reform Member Quits, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 29, 2017),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/04/29/2003669625.
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perception to the media, not to information from friends or rela-
tives.
142
The media in Taiwan is very free,
143
and it also tends
to be highly polarized: Reporters Without Borders noted in their
2019 World Press Freedom Index that “Taiwan’s journalists are
suffering from a very polarized media environment dominated
by sensationalism and the pursuit of profit.”
144
Jonathan Sulli-
van explains as follows regarding the complicated dynamics of
coevolving media, civil society, and political spheres in Taiwan:
Governments, parties, and politicians have reduced control
over what is said about them, by whom, and even the reproduc-
tion of their own words (Soroka, 2014: 75). On the other hand,
the emergence of social media as a vehicle for unmediated com-
munication has become established as a powerful means to
reach voters and citizens directly.
145
Accordingly, because the media is in part fueling negative views
of the legal system, increasing transparency and clarity such
that more information is transmitted directly from the govern-
ment to the citizenry might bolster public confidence without a
concomitant need for actual participation. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that greater transparency and clarity alone, without ac-
companying substantive reforms, will be enough to mollify pub-
lic concerns.
Heightened transparency and clarity could make the public re-
alize that they are even more dissatisfied with the legal system
than originally thought. In such case, public participation may
be seen as all the more necessary to change how the system ac-
tually operates. As mock trials across Taiwan of the proposed
lay-judge system demonstrated, however, the devil is in the de-
tails: proclaiming public participation in the abstract is much
142. JUDICIAL YUAN, INTRODUCING LAY PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN: FOCUSING
ONLAYPARTICIPATION INMOOTCOURTS (2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL YUAN, INTRODUCING LAY PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN].
143. According to FreedomHouse, “Taiwan’s media environment is one of the
freest in Asia, and the vigorous and diverse press reports aggressively on gov-
ernment policies and alleged official wrongdoing.” Freedom of the Press 2017:
Taiwan, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2017/Taiwan (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
144. Taiwan, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/taiwan (last
visited May 24, 2019).
145. Jonathan Sullivan, The Coevolution of Media and Politics in Taiwan:
Implications for Political Communications, 2 INT’L J. TAIWAN STUD. 85, 90
(2018) (citing STEWART SOROKA, NEGATIVITY IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: CAUSES
ANDCONSEQUENCES 75 (2014)).
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easier than structuring the procedures by which such participa-
tion will occur.
A further possible outcome of the reform debate is that the at-
tributes that come to define Taiwan’s legal identity in the popu-
lar consciousness might not accurately reflect reality. In Amer-
ica, for example, the jury trial captures people’s imaginations as
a defining characteristic. The right to a jury is enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution and glorified in movies and television. In real-
ity, jury trials make up but a sliver of criminal cases.
146
Like-
wise, the effort described below to inject lay decisionmakers into
criminal cases might be contained to a small percentage of cases.
Yet this procedural shift could influence how the broader citi-
zenry views the judicial system. If over time the public feels
more connected to the legal system, this phenomenon could help
foster a shared sense of identity among the populace regarding
what it means to be Taiwanese (Part III.D). For now, although
where the reform path will lead is not clear, that the principles
of transparency, clarity, and participation are helping to shape
that path is.
A. Transparency
Legal reform discussions in Taiwan are rife with language of
“transparency.”
147
In some respects the workings of the legal sys-
tem are already quite open to view, including detailed statistics
available on past cases.
148
Access to an online database provides
an important window into the system, but pages of numbers do
not tell the full story of how that system actually operates. Today
146. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS &
FOUNDATION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION ANDHOW TO SAVE IT
(2018), available at https://www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport/.
147. See, e.g.,Wei Tisheng Sifa Toumingdu, Jianchaguan Jie An Shulei Ying-
gai Gongkai (為提升司法透明度，檢察官結案書類應該公開) [For the Promotion
of Transparent Justice, Prosecutors’ Case-Closing Documents Should be Re-
leased], SIFAGAIGEGUO SHIHUIYI （司法改革國是會議） [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON
JUD. REFORM], https://justice.president.gov.tw/issue/14 (last visited Apr. 24,
2019); Sifa Touming Hua (司法透明化) [Judicial Transparency], SIFA GAIGE
GUO SHI HUIYI (司法改革國是會議) [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON JUD. REFORM],
https://justice.president.gov.tw/opinion/443 (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
148. See SIFA TONGJI (司法統計) [JUDICIAL STATISTICS], https://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/juds/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
2019] Forging Taiwan’s Legal Identity 519
there is a push to “open the courts’ doors” both literally and fig-
uratively.
149
This connects to President Tsai’s broader pledge
made during her campaign for president that “[m]y government
will not just communicate. I will also demand it to be transpar-
ent.”
150
With respect to the transparency of the reform process, there
were public discussions surrounding the 1999 Reform Confer-
ence.
151
Nevertheless, the Conference largely played out behind
closed doors. In part the lack of access to the inner workings of
the 1999 Reform Conference is attributable to technological
changes: the Internet was still in its infancy. In contrast, trans-
parency was a stated goal for the 2017 Reform Conference.
152
The dedicated website includes sections for each of the five sub-
committees,
153
providing meeting minutes, other documents,
149. SIFA YUAN (司法院) [JUDICIAL YUAN], TAIWAN GAODENG FAYUAN
GAOXIONG FENYUAN DAKAI FAYUAN DAMEN, REQING YAOQING GAOXIONG SHI
QIAOTOUQU 35WEIDIFANG YIJIAN LINGXIUDAO FAYUAN CANGUAN (臺灣高等法
院高雄分院打開法院大門，熱情邀請高雄市橋頭區35 位地方意見領袖到法院參觀)
[Kaohsiung Branch of the Taiwan High Court Opened the Court’s Doors and
Warmly Welcomed 35 Local Opinion Leaders from Qiaotou District of
Kaohsiung City to Visit the Court] (2017) (“打開法院大門”).
150. Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文 ), Wuda Zhengzhi Gaige (五大政治改革) [Five Ma-
jor Political Reforms], LIGHT UP TAIWAN (點亮台灣 ) (Aug. 16, 2015),
http://iing.tw/posts/51, translated in Tsai Ing-wen’s Five Major Reforms, LIGHT
UP TAIWAN (Aug. 16, 2015), http://iing.tw/en/21.
151. See 1999 Quanguo Sigai Huiyi (1999全國司改會議) [1999 National Ju-
dicial Reform Conference], JUD. REFORM FOUND. (民間司法改革基金會),
https://www.jrf.org.tw/keywords/7 (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (compilation of
documents related to 1999 reform conference).
152. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 12 (section of report
detailing steps taken to make the sub-committees’ discussions and relevant
documentation available to the public).
153. Fenzu Jieshao (分組介紹) [Sub-Committee Introductions], SIFA GAIGE
GUO SHI HUIYI (司法改革國是會議) [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON JUD. REFORM],
https://justice.president.gov.tw/meetinggroup (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
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and video footage with simultaneous sign-language interpreta-
tion.
154
Video of the over-eight-hour closing meeting is also avail-
able.
155
A month after the 2017 Reform Conference’s conclusion,
President Tsai’s office issued a 152-page report on the proceed-
ings.
156
This official record is extensive, but of course does not
capture the informal discussions among participants. Lawyer
Chen Chung-yen, for example, withdrew from the preparatory
committee for the conference because “several important discus-
sions had been conducted in a ¶black box’ behind closed doors.”
157
The government has continued transparency initiatives since
the 2017 Reform Conference concluded. President Tsai promised
in October 2017 that “the government will have a biannual re-
port to the people on the progress of [judicial] reform.”
158
The
government also maintains a website dedicated to judicial re-
forms, including semi-annual reports on progress.
159
With respect to transparency of the system that the reform
process is creating, reform discussions are addressing the lim-
ited access to information from the investigation stage all the
way through to the Constitutional Court’s practice of largely de-
ciding cases without oral argument. One focus of debate has
been on broadcasting trials. Opening trials to public in-person
view followed in the wake of democratization.
160
Vestiges of the
154. Zongtong Fu Sifa Gaige Guo Shi Huiyi Di Wu Fenzu Di Yi Ci Huiyi (總
統府司法改革國是會議第五分組第一次會議) [First Meeting of the Fifth Sub-Com-
mittee of the Presidential National Affairs Conference on Judicial Reform], SIFA
GAIGE GUO SHI HUIYI (司法改革國是會議) [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON JUD. REFORM]
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://justice.president.gov.tw/meeting/15.
155. 「Zongtong Fu Sifa Gaige Guo Shi Huiyi」Zongjie Huiyi (「總統府司法
改革國是會議」總結會議) [Concluding Meeting of the Presidential National Af-
fairs Conference on Judicial Reform], SIFAGAIGEGUO SHIHUIYI (司法改革國是
會議) [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON JUD. REFORM] (Aug. 11, 2017), https://justice.presi-
dent.gov.tw/meeting/55.
156. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138.
157. Huang & Chung, supra note 141.
158. Tsai Ing-wen, Address at the Republic of China’s 106th Double Tenth
National Day Celebration (Oct. 10, 2017), translated in President Tsai Delivers
2017 National Day Address, TAIPEI ECON. & CULTURAL OFF., MUSCAT, OMAN
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://english.president.gov.tw/ NEWS/5231 [hereinafter Tsai,
2017 National Day Address].
159. See SIFA GAIGE JINDU ZHUIZONG PINGTAI (司法改革進度追蹤平台)
[TRACKING PLATFORM FOR THE PROGRESS OF JUDICIAL REFORMS], https://judi-
cialreform.gov.tw (last visited May 24, 2019).
160. Criminal trials are generally open to the public with closure allowed in
limited circumstances. See, e.g., Chih-Chieh Lin, Failing to Achieve the Goal:
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authoritarian era held on into the 2000s with so-called “public
security tribunals” (“治安法庭”) handling hooligan cases using
closed-door proceedings and secret witnesses.
161
The Constitu-
tional Court held these secretive practices unconstitutional in
2008.
162
The reform debate has placed increasing emphasis on whether
physical access to courtrooms is sufficient. Cameras have been
allowed in courtrooms on limited occasions. For instance, court
proceedings in the 2006 graft case of former President Chen’s
wife were showed on closed-circuit television in the court audi-
torium because of intense public interest.
163
The possibility of
broadcasting trials outside courthouses was on the agenda of the
2017 Reform Conference,
164
and debate continued after the Con-
ference’s conclusion.
165
A number of concerns have dampened enthusiasm for broad-
casting trials, such as the safety of participants at trial, the
“right to be forgotten,”
166
and the erosion of the presumption of
innocence.
167
There are already worries that some government
officials are undermining the presumption of innocence by
providing unauthorized information to the media. The interna-
tional experts who evaluated Taiwan’s implementation of the
A Feminist Perspective on Why Rape Law Reform in Taiwan Has Been Unsuc-
cessful, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 163, 175 n.85 (2010) (noting that trials
for sexual assault are not open unless both the victim and court agree).
161. Jerome A. Cohen & Margaret K. Lewis, How Taiwan’s Constitutional
Court Reined in Police Power: Lessons for the People’s Republic of China, 37
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 863, 869 (2014).
162. Id. at 870.
163. See Piao-Hao Hsu, The Right to Be Forgotten and its Ramifications in
Taiwan, China and Japan, BLOG DROIT EUROPÉEN (June 2017), https://blog-
droiteuropeen.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/bobby-article-taiwan-final-ver-
sion.pdf. See generally Lawrence Chung, Taiwan’s First Lady Charged with
Graft, S. CHINAMORNING POST (H.K.), Nov. 4, 2006, at 1.
164. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 37.
165. Sifa Yuan (司法院) [Judicial Yuan], Fating Gongkai Bosong Xianguan
Yiti Gong Tihui (法庭公開播送相關議題共體會) [Hearing on Issues Related to
the Public Broadcasting of Courts] (Oct. 11, 2017) (notes from hearing con-
vened by the Judicial Yuan on file with author).
166. Cf. Piao-Hao Hsu, supra note 163; Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be For-
gotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012) (“In theory, the right to be for-
gotten addresses an urgent problem in the digital age: it is very hard to escape
your past on the Internet now that every photo, status update, and tweet lives
forever in the cloud.”).
167. Piao-Hao Hsu, supra note 163 (conference materials on file with author).
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ICCPR in 2013 called on the government to “take effective ad-
ministrative and criminal measures to punish officials who re-
lease information about criminal cases to the media in violation
of the laws and regulations designed to safeguard the presump-
tion of innocence.”
168
The concern now is that selective use of
trial footage could further color views of a defendant’s guilt.
Moreover, the road to a final not-guilty verdict tends to be par-
ticularly long in Taiwan: second-instance trials are essentially
“do overs” of the initial trials³comprehensively addressing is-
sues of both facts and law³and prosecutors are allowed to ap-
peal not-guilty verdicts.
169
While proposals to broadcast trials have received strong
pushback, there is support for greater emphasis on oral argu-
ments before the Constitutional Court. The court has a beautiful
courtroom in which to hold arguments (and can also welcome
independent experts to weigh in on a case), but it has done so on
only rare occasions.
170
Instead, rulings are commonly based on
the case file and other written sources.
171
In early 2017, the court
took the bold move of broadcasting oral argument in the same-
sex marriage case.
172
Recent debates have addressed whether
the court should adopt as general practice both the holding of
oral argument and the broadcasting of those arguments.
173
The Constitutional Court is already more transparent than
other courts in Taiwan in one notable respect: allowing for con-
curring and dissenting opinions. Justices can publish their indi-
vidual views on a case, which are posted on the court’s website
168. REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS:
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ¶ 67 (2013), available at
https://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/CORs_01032013.pdf.
169. See Kai-ping Su, Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan: A Case of Frag-
mented Reform in a Not Fragmented Court System, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203,
218²19 (2017).
170. See Cohen & Lewis, supra note 161.
171. For an analysis of the Constitutional Court’s work, see David S. Law &
Wen-chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV.
523 (2011).
172. See Yang Ko-wen &William Hetherington, Council of Grand Justices to
Broadcast Live Discussion of Same-Sex Marriage, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 11, 2017,
http://www.taipeitimes. com/News/front/archives/2017/02/11/2003664765.
173. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 43.
2019] Forging Taiwan’s Legal Identity 523
along with the court’s interpretation.
174
This option is not avail-
able for judges in other courts. Indeed, even if a judge on a three-
judge collegial panel disagrees with the verdict, it is standard
practice for the dissenting judge to sign the verdict. Moreover,
the dissenting judge can be assigned to write the opinion. There
is no trace whether the verdict was unanimous or merely a ma-
jority, let alone why a dissenting judge decided as he did. A
longstanding tendency to focus on collegiality that can tip to-
wards conformity means it is unlikely this practice will change
soon.
The calls for greater transparency apply to past cases too.
Work by Taiwan’s Innocence Project, other civil society groups,
and academics have drawn attention to the fact that Taiwan,
like all countries, is not immune to wrongful convictions.
175
The
conditions for an innocence project took time to develop as Tai-
wan shifted towards democracy. The Taiwan Innocence Project
was not founded until 2012, though efforts to overturn wrongful
convictions predate its establishment.
176
Groups have sought
greater access to information on old cases and have obtained ex-
onerations using newly uncovered evidence.
177
In turn, they are
calling attention to the troublesome practices used in past inves-
tigations and trials to galvanize reform efforts. One proposal in
174. Constitutional interpretations, along with concurring and dissenting
opinions if any, are available at SIFA YUAN DA FAGUAN (司法院大法官)
[CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, JUDICIAL YUAN, R.O.C.], https://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/P03.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
175. Here, “wrongful conviction” refers “to the convictions of factually inno-
cent persons. . . . This definition excludes persons who have committed the act
and mens rea of crimes but whose convictions were obtained in violation of
constitutional or other procedural rights in a manner not deemed harmless
error by appellate courts.” Marvin Zalman, Wrongful Conviction, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0118.xml (last modified July 24, 2012).
176. TAIWAN YUANYU PINGFAN XIEHUI (台灣冤獄平反協會) [TAIWAN
INNOCENCEPROJECT], http://twinnocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
177. See YUANYU PINGFAN XIEHUI (冤獄平反協會) [TAIWAN ASSOCIATION FOR
INNOCENCE], 2016 GONGZUO BAOGAO (2016 工作報告) [2016 ANNUAL REPORT]
(2016), available at http://twinnocenceproject.org/news.php?lang=en.
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the 2017 Reform Conference was to introduce an entity that re-
sembles conviction integrity units popping up across the United
States
178
and similar efforts in Europe.
179
The 2017 Reform Conference further addressed how transi-
tional justice (轉型正義) could be used to help rectify “improper
trials” held during the martial law era.
180
On February 28, 1947,
and the days following, the KMT killed thousands of protestors
who were enraged at the new government’s treatment of the ex-
isting population.
181
Martial law was officially imposed in 1949
and stretched until 1987.
182
The four decades of martial law saw
“massive suppression, murder, and imprisonment of political
dissidents. . . .”
183
There are unanswered questions regarding the
treatment of government critics during this period as well as re-
garding the finances of the KMT and related organizations. Con-
sequently, another aspect of the transparency debate is access-
ing information about the authoritarian past.
Prior to the DPP taking control of the presidency and legisla-
ture in 2016, “the KMT-dominated legislature introduced three
important (but limited) pieces of legislation related to transi-
tional justice.”
184
Shortly after the DPP gained a majority in
178. See NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016 2
(Mar. 7, 2017), available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera-
tion/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf.
179. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 28 (discussing pos-
sible establishment of a 刑事確定案件檢視機制). Taiwan already has in place
laws addressing compensation for wrongful detentions (刑事補償法) and state
compensation more generally (國家賠償法), though concerns have been raised
about their adequacy.
180. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 28 (“研議建立戒嚴時
期疑似不當審判之有罪判決救濟機制”). For a discussion of the broader push for
transitional justice, see generally Ernest Caldwell, Transitional Justice Legis-
lation in Taiwan Before and During the Tsai Administration, 27 WASH. INT’L
L.J. 449 (2018).
181. See Chris Horton, Taiwan Commemorates a Violent Nationalistic Epi-
sode, 70 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/02/26/world/asia/taiwan-1947-kuomintang.html?_r=0 [herein-
after Horton, Taiwan Commemorates a Violent Nationalistic Episode].
182. Taiwan Ends 4 Decades of Martial Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 1987),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-dec-
ades-of-martial-law.html.
183. Thomas J. Shattuck, Taiwan’s White Terror: Remembering the 228 Inci-
dent, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.fpri.org/arti-
cle/2017/02/taiwans-white-terror-remembering-228-incident/.
184. Caldwell, supra note 180, at 462 (discussing the 1995 Act Governing the
Recovery of Damage of Individual Rights During the Period of Martial Rule,
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2016, the legislature passed the Act Governing the Settlement
of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate
Organizations.
185
As of December 2018, the government had “fro-
zen assets worth billions of dollars of private companies and non-
governmental organizations that have been determined to be
KMT affiliates. . . .”
186
In December 2017, the legislature passed the Act on Promot-
ing Transitional Justice.
187
Under the Act, a nine-member Tran-
sitional Justice Commission has the power to investigate docu-
ments from the martial-law era.
188
In addition, “Criminal cases
found to have been unjustly adjudicated on are to be reinvesti-
gated by the committee, with defendants granted retrial.”
189
The
Commission, however, has been beset by political divisions, in-
cluding the resignation of the deputy chair after exposure of his
anti-KMT remarks.
190
1995 February 28 Incident Disposition and Compensation Act, and 1998 Com-
pensation Act for Improper Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage Dur-
ing the Martial Law Period).
185. Zhengdang Ji Qi Fu Sui Zuzhi Budang Qude Caichan Chuli Tiaoli (政黨
及其附隨組織不當取得財產處理條例) [ The Act Governing the Settlement of Ill-
Gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations]
(promulgated Aug. 10, 2016) (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0030286.
186. Nien-Chung Chang-Liao & Yu-Jie Chen, Transitional Justice in Tai-
wan: Changes and Challenges, WASH. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manu-
script at 14²15) (on file with author).
187. Cujin Zhuanxing Zhengyi Tiaoli (促進轉型正義條例) [Act on Promoting
Transitional Justice] (promulgated Dec. 27, 2017) (Taiwan), available at
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030296; see also
Cheng-hsiang Fan et al., Transitional Justice Law Milestone for Taiwan’s De-
mocracy, FOCUS TAIWAN (Dec. 6, 2017), http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201712060017.aspx.
188. See Jane Rickards, Coming to Terms with the Past, TAIWANBUS. TOPICS
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2018/09/coming-to-terms-with-
the-past/#. For a discussion of the severe repression under martial law, see
CHAO&MYERS, supra note 61, at 52 (“To enforce compliance with martial law,
the Taiwan Garrison Command, Security Bureau, police, and military courts
arrested, tried, and imprisoned or executed any individual they considered a
threat to national security and public order.”).
189. See Sean Lin, Lawmakers Pass Transitional Justice Act, TAIPEI TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar-
chives/2017/12/06/2003683504.
190. See Brian Hioe, Anger After KMT Disrupts Transitional Justice Com-
mission Meeting, NEW BLOOM MAG. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://newbloom-
mag.net/2018/12/12/transitional-justice-disrupt/.
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These cumulative efforts towards transparency are a depar-
ture from the traditional legal world that, while not opaque, re-
quired significant effort and expertise to access. Even if Taiwan
succeeds in bringing intense sunlight into the legal system, it
remains to be seen whether the public will take advantage of
added transparency. Furthermore, even if the courts’ doors are
thrown open, will people understand what they see? This is
where clarity comes in.
B. Clarity
Access does not automatically bring understanding. The Mu-
seum of Modern Art in New York City has millions of visitors
annually.
191
Without the help of audio tours, docents, apps, and
other resources, many of these millions with access to the art
would not grasp the meaning behind the abstract work. Like-
wise, simply showing people the legal system’s workings is
vastly different from helping them to comprehend the import of
what they are viewing. Clarity, in the sense of being easily un-
derstood,
192
is hard to achieve.
At a minimum, the Constitutional Court has held that sub-
stantive laws must be clear and specific enough to satisfy the
principle of legal clarity.
193
A basic understanding of what be-
havior the law proscribes is, however, a far cry from grasping
how the legal system actually operates. A 2015 survey conducted
by the Judicial Yuan found that 71.6 percent of respondents re-
ported not understanding the legal system.
194
The desire for clar-
ity in the legal system begins by making the debate about re-
forms itself more accessible. It further combines efforts to
191. See Erica Orden, MOMA Attendance Hits Record High, WALL ST. J.
(June 29, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748703964104575335301840480246.
192. Clarity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/clarity.
193. See, e.g., SIFAYUAN DA FAGUAN HUIYI (司法院大法官會議) [COUNCIL OF
GRAND JUSTICES], INTERPRETATION NO. 710 (July 5, 2013), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=710.
194. JUDICIAL YUAN, INTRODUCING LAY PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN, supra note
142.
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change aspects of the legal system to make it more easily under-
standable with efforts to educate the public about how the sys-
tem works.
195
Debates about the relative merits of adversarial and inquisito-
rial models are hard enough for law professors to decipher, let
alone someone without any legal training.
196
The current round
of reform debates has deemphasized legal lingo like “reformed
adversarial system” in favor of more catchy terminology, such as
“citizen judge” (“國民法官”) for the proposed lay participants at
trial. To help people understand legal terminology that might
require some explanation, the judiciary launched an online dic-
tionary in August 2017,
197
complete with a how-to YouTube
video.
198
The Judicial Yuan explained that the initiative was
meant to increase dialogue between the judiciary and public, as
well as to help people “fully understand” legal terminology.
199
The usually formal Judicial Yuan has even gone so far as to
incorporate comic drawings and social messaging “stickers.”
200
195. Scholars have discussed at length the connection between understand-
ing laws and legitimacy. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flow-
ers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23
MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 479 n.17 (2002) (“[Max Weber] maintained that citizens
were more likely to find clear, predictable laws that are fairly applied by an
autonomous judiciary legitimate, and that they would be more likely to com-
ply³without the need for coercion³with laws they found legitimate.”) (citing
MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein
ed., 1954)).
196. Cf. DAMAäKA, supra note 98, 3²6 (different uses of “adversarial” and “in-
quisitorial”).
197. Caipan Shu Yongyu Cidian Ziliao Ku Chaxun Xitong (裁判書用語辭典 –
資料庫查詢系統 ) [Dictionary of Terms Used in Judicial Decisions – Database
Search System], JUD. YUAN (司法院), http://terms.judicial.gov.tw/Search.aspx
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
198. Judicial Yuan Sifa Yuan Yingyin（Judicial Yuan 司法院影音）, Caipan
Shu Yongyu Cidian Ziliao Ku Chaxun Xitong [Ruhe Shiyong Ben Xitong]
Jieshao Duanpian (裁判書用語辭典資料庫查詢系統 [如何使用本系統]介紹短片)
[Dictionary of Terms Used in Judicial Decisions – Database Search System
[How To Use This System] Introductory Video], YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmeAc5SwF94&feature=youtu.be.
199. Sifa Yuan Guihua Jianzhi Caipan Shu Yongyu Cidian Ziliao Ku 8 Yuedi
Shangxian Shiyong (司法院規劃建置裁判書用語辭典資料庫 8月底上線試用) [Ju-
dicial Yuan Plans to Set Up a Dictionary of Terms Used in Judicial Decisions
To Begin Use at the End of August], JUD. WKLY. (司法院周刊), May 19, 2017,
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/jw9706/pdf/20170519-1850-1.pdf.
200. Social media has deep penetration in Taiwan. See Jalen Chung& Evelyn
Kao, Taiwanese Love Social Networks, Especially Facebook: Survey, FOCUS
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The Judicial Yuan has an account on the popular LINE social
media platform,
201
through which information on judicial proce-
dures are portrayed using cartoon drawings.
202
For example, a
drawing regarding efforts to strengthen translation services de-
picts a woman with hearts coming out of her head as she trans-
lates between Chinese and English.
203
That using LINE would
help close the distance between the judiciary and the public was
a stated aim when establishing the account in August 2017.
204
The LINE account both provides a way for the judiciary to com-
municate directly with the citizenry and is designed to do so in
an easily understandable, funmanner. A judge at the Taipei Dis-
trict Court initiated a similar measure to make the judicial sys-
tem more accessible and even cute: he drew the following Rich-
ard-Scarry-esque
205
poster to promote the proposed lay-judge
system, which depicts the six lay-judges as various animals
found in Taiwan and exhorts people to participate in the com-
mon task of defending justice.
TAIWAN (June 13, 2014), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201406130020.aspx
(“Over 96 percent of Taiwanese Internet users in a survey said they had used
social networking sites within the previous two weeks”).
201. See Rosalie Chan,What Makes These Chat Apps Popular in Certain Asia
Countries, INVERSE INNOVATION (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/arti-
cle/29223-asian-countries-chat-apps (reporting that 80% of Taiwan uses
LINE).
202. Sifa Yuan (司法院), LINE, https://page.line.me/judicial_yuan (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2019).
203. Sifa Yuan (司法院), LINE (Feb. 7, 2018, 11:30PM) (last visited Apr. 24,
2019). Although the Judicial Yuan’s LINE account is new, the use of cute
graphics has long been common in Taiwan as apparent from the LINE “sticker”
shop, LINE STORE, https://store.line.me/home/en (last visited Apr. 24, 2019),
and the fleet of EVA Air “Hello Kitty” planes, HELLO KITTY: EVA AIR,
http://www.evakitty.com/tw/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
204. Sifa Yuan LINE Guanfang Zhanghao Ji Caipan Shu Yongyu Cidian
Shangxian Lajin yu Minzhong Juli (司法院LINE官方帳號及裁判書用語辭典上
線 拉近與民眾距離) [Judicial Yuan LINE Account and Dictionary of Terms
Used in Judicial Decisions are Online, Closing the Gap With the People], JUD.
WKLY. (司法院周刊) (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/jw9706/pdf/20170811-1862-1.pdf.
205. Cf. RICHARD SCARRY, BUSY BUSY TOWN (2000), available at
https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/161319/richard-scarrys-busy-
busy-town-by-written-and-illustrated-by-richard-scarry/9780307168030/.
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Efforts to convey laws in accessible language and images re-
calls Sally Merry’s work on how domestic actors bring interna-
tional human rights norms into domestic spheres.
206
In Taiwan,
there is a conversation about how best to incorporate interna-
tional norms into domestic practice through a process of “vernac-
ularization.”
207
The pathways for the initial permeation of inter-
national human rights norms into Taiwan are interesting be-
cause Taiwan is largely excluded from international organiza-
tions. What this Article focuses on is the intra-country conversa-
tion as domestic legal elites transmit information to the broader
citizenry. Aspects of this conversation within Taiwan have direct
connections to international human rights norms (e.g., to the
presumption of innocence and requirement of an impartial tri-
bunal in the ICCPR
208
). Other aspects are tied to considerations
of Taiwan’s distinct legal history (e.g., how a mixed-bench for-
mat for lay participation³as compared with an American-style
jury³is more aligned with the civil law tradition from the ROC
legal codes and historical Japanese influence). Experts thus
need to explain both legal norms that have been explicitly
206. See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER
VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).
207. See Chen, Socialization in Isolation, supra note 111, at 89²90 (“I borrow
the concept of ¶vernacularization’ proposed by Sally Merry in explaining how
the international human rights discourse is translated into another discourse
more familiar to the local audience.”).
208. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
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brought in from abroad in recent years and those that have de-
veloped within Taiwan over many decades. To be effective, this
conversation requires a move away from legal lingo towards ter-
minology that is understandable to people without specialized
training: “Vernacularizers take the ideas and practices of one
group and present them in terms that another group will accept.
This is not the work of a single person.”
209
This work is not the government’s alone. Initiatives to demys-
tify the legal system extend beyond official channels. Over
47,000 people follow the “Read Judgments Together” (“一起讀判
決”) page on Facebook.
210
The authors of the Facebook page and
related webpage
211
are anonymous though widely rumored that
at least some are judges. This is understandable considering
that the media’s tendency to paint the judiciary in a negative
light has left frustrated judges seeking avenues to express their
views directly to the public. The site is self-described as a place
to share judgments, essays, and other legal information.
212
A
post in February 2018, for instance, used colorful diagrams to
explain a draft proposal to amend administration litigation pro-
cedures.
213
Another Facebook page, “法操FOLLAW,” has over
60,000 followers.
214
FOLLAW takes a more contentious stance
towards the current system, asking if the decisions of “dinosaur
judges” make people want to curse.
215
The Facebook page
209. Peggy Levitt & Sally Merry, Vernacularization on the Ground: Local
Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States, 9
GLOBALNETWORKS 441, 446 (2009).
210. Yiqi Du Panjue (一起讀判決) (@legal.taiwan), FACEBOOK, https://www.fa-
cebook.com/legal.taiwan/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); cf. Chung & Kao, supra
note 200 (reporting Facebook’s vast penetration in Taiwan).
211. YIQI DU PANJUE (一起讀判決), https://casebf.com/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2019).
212. Jianjie (簡介), YIQI DU PANJUE (一起讀判決),
https://casebf.com/%e7%b0%a1%e4%bb%8b/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
213. Sifa Yuan de Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzheng Cao’an (司法院的行政訴訟
法修正草案) [Judicial Yuan’s Draft Amendments to the Administrative Proce-
dure Law], YIQI DU PANJUE (一起讀判決) (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://casebf.com/2018/ 02/27/administrative_pyramid/.
214. Fa Cao FOLLAW (法操FOLLAW) (@follawfollaw), FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/follawfollaw/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) and related
website Fa Cao FOLLAW (法操FOLLAW), https://www.follaw.tw/ (last visited
Apr. 24, 2019).
215. Fa Cao FOLLAW (法操FOLLAW) (@follawfollaw), About, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pg/follawfollaw/about/?ref=page_internal (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2019) (“恐龍法官的判決常讓你氣到破口大罵”).
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“Watchout Citizenedu” (“沃草公民學院”), with over 27,000 fol-
lowers, tackles legal issues as well as broader topics of public
concern.
216
Going a step beyond explaining the meaning of legal docu-
ments, there are efforts underway to actually change how judges
and prosecutors write. Part of the schooling for trainee judges
and prosecutors is learning the esoteric conventions expected of
their writing. These norms tend to result in a dense legalese that
is difficult for even native Chinese speakers to understand. Frus-
tration over the lack of accessibility has given rise to a debate
over how to move towards use of plain language (白話文).
217
The
“Plain Law Movement” (“法律白話文運動”) Facebook page has
over 88,000 followers.
218
The group’s website features a photo of
youngish, casually attired people who describe themselves as
having legal training and using new media to spread the seeds
of rule of law: “For the average person, because the contents of
the law that should serve the people are as hard to understand
as classical Chinese, the laws are increasingly removed from the
people.”
219
Legal writing style was part of the 2017 Reform Con-
ference’s agenda.
220
The relevant sub-committee passed a reso-
lution supporting the move towards plain language, which was
hailed by reform advocates as a way to “make people understand
court judgments.”
221
216. Wo Cao Gongmin Xueyuan (沃草公民學院 ² Watchout Citizenedu) (@cit-
izenedu), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/citizenedu/ (last visited Apr.
24, 2019); Wo Cao Gongmin Xueyuan (沃草公民學院 ² Watchout Citizenedu)
(@citizenedu), About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/citi-
zenedu/about/?ref=page_internal (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
217. See, e.g., Lai Peixuan (賴佩璇), Sifa Baihuawen Yundong? Faguan Pan-
jue Xie「Qingjin Honghuang Zhi Li」 Yin Re Yi (司法白話文運動？法官判決寫
「窮盡洪荒之力」引熱議) [Judicial Plain Language Movement? Judges’ Opin-
ion [Exhausting the Power of Antiquity] Prompts Heated Debates], UDNNEWS
(聯合新聞網) (June 7, 2017), https://udn.com/news/story/7321/2510196.
218. Falu Baihuawen Yundong ³ Plain Law Movement (法律白話文運動 ³
Plain Law Movement) (@plainlaw.me), FACEBOOK, https://www.face-
book.com/plainlaw.me/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
219. Women Shi Shui（我們是誰）[Who Are We], PLAINL.MOVEMENT (法律白
話文運動), https://plainlaw.me/whoarewe/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (“對一般
人而言，本該為人民服務的法律，因為內容有如文言文難懂，反而離人民越來越
遠.”).
220. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 70²71.
221. See Su Weirong (蘇位榮), Sigai Huiyi Tongguo Panjueshu Yaorang Ren-
ren Kandong (司改會議通過 判決書要讓人人看懂) [Judicial Reform Meeting
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Much of the heavily stylized legal language is inculcated dur-
ing the two-year training period that future judges and prosecu-
tors undergo following selection through a highly competitive
exam.
222
The issue, however, starts earlier. Law school in Tai-
wan remains heavily focused on learning the contents of the
“small six laws” (“小六法”): the compilation of the six founda-
tional laws composed of the Constitution, Civil Code, Criminal
Code, Administrative Code, Civil Procedure Code, and Criminal
Procedure Code.
223
Heavily highlighted and flagged versions are
de rigueur for law students. This is logical when considering the
incentives of students are to focus on passing the extremely com-
petitive exams that will determine if they can become a judge,
prosecutor, or lawyer.
224
Especially compared to the United
States,
225
there has been little emphasis on legal research and
writing or other more practical skills.
226
Clinical legal education
has also been slow to take hold.
227
As a result, law students tend
not to have experience explaining the law to clients or other non-
Passes that Judicial Opinions Must be Understandable to People], UDNNEWS
(聯合新聞網) (Mar. 25, 2017), https://udn.com/news/story/7321/2363796.
222. Kaufman Winn & Yeh, supra note 88, at 573²74 (explaining history of
restrictions on bar passage rates).
223. The collection of laws is available in a number of print versions which,
due to frequent amendments, require continuous updating. See Xiao Liufa
Souxun Jieguo (小六法搜尋結果) [Small Six Laws Search Results], ESLITE,
http://www.eslite.com/Search_BW.aspx?query=%E5%B0%8F%E5%85%AD%
E6%B3%95 (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (search result on webpage of major Tai-
wan bookstore with various editions of the small six laws).
224. Lo, Possible Reform for Legal Education in Taiwan, supra note 99, at 4
(“[M]any [law] students spend most of their time at preparation schools learn-
ing pure examination techniques and neglecting university legal education.”).
225. See, e.g., Legal Education Panel Solicits Input on Teaching Skills, Test-
ing and Expanding Access, A.B.A. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.ameri-
canbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2018/02/legal_education_pane/.
226. Some law schools in Taiwan are encouraging greater experimentation,
such as National Chiao Tung University School of Law in Hsinchu City, which
“has been traditionally placing significant focus on integrating legal theory
with real-world practices.” National Chiao Tung University: Institute of Tech-
nology Law—Doctoral Degree, STUDY IN TAIWAN, https://www.studyintai-
wan.org/programs/program/3173 (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
227. See generally Serge A. Martinez, Reinventing Clinical Legal Education:
Taiwanese Adaptation of an American Model, in LEGAL THOUGHTS BETWEEN
THE EAST AND WEST IN THE MULTILEVEL LEGAL ORDER 491²504 (2016) (“Tai-
wan’s legal educators have resisted clinical education for a very long time, and
there are several practical obstacles to implementing an American-style
clinic.”).
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legally-trained audiences, nor is this skill presented as integral
to working in the legal profession.
One important component of achieving greater clarity is
changing how people in the legal profession express their work.
A clear message alone, however, is insufficient: someone needs
to be listening. Tens of thousands of people engaging in legal
discussions on Facebook is impressive, yet it is only a small per-
centage of the overall population of Taiwan. The most direct way
to cultivate understanding among the younger generation is
through schools.
A point of controversy in post-martial-law Taiwan has been
how to teach topics like history and civics that are laden with
political overtones. Tensions came to a head under President Ma
in 2015 when students protested “black box textbooks,” so called
because they were seen as being “pushed through by undemo-
cratic, untransparent means”: “Planned textbook revisions as
pushed for by the KMT would, for example, continue to claim
that Taiwan is a part of the ¶Republic of China’ which is the
rightful master of mainland China.”
228
Critics have used the
term “black box” to describe other government decisions made
behind closed doors.
229
DPP legislators criticized the proposed
changes, with one calling them “a bid to manipulate students’
view of history.”
230
The DPP moved quickly once retaking power in 2016 to scrap
the KMT’s proposed changes and undertake the contentious pro-
cess of reviewing the national education system curriculum.
231
Components of this debate include how to teach the fundamen-
tals of the legal system and the rights and duties of being a citi-
zen.
232
This is challenging even in places that do not have the
228. Brian Hioe, Five Days of Struggle Against Black Box Education in Tai-
wan, NEW BLOOM MAG. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://newbloom-
mag.net/2015/08/03/five-days-against-black-box-education/.
229. Id. (explaining that “black box” was also used to describe the opaque
process when the KMT sought legislative approval for the Cross-Strait Service
Trade Agreement in 2014).
230. Rachel Lin et al., DPP Legislator Slams Textbook Changes, TAIPEITIMES
(Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar-
chives/2014/01/19/2003581611.
231. See Gerrit van der Wees, Taiwan’s History Textbook Protests: One Year
Later, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 1, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/taiwans-his-
tory-textbook-protests-one-year-later/.
232. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 7 (stating that edu-
cation on the rule of law is insufficient, “法治教育的不足”).
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layers of political complexity seen in Taiwan.
233
For people writ-
ing textbooks in Taiwan, they face the thorny task of explaining
the legal system to students without the curriculum being
viewed as a political ploy by one party or the other.
One response is to sidestep political controversy by writing
bland textbooks, but a failure to provide a robust civics curricu-
lum largely relegates public education to diffuse public-infor-
mation campaigns that do not directly reach citizens as a captive
audience in a classroom. A rare exception occurred at a mock
trial attended by the author in spring 2018 at the district court
for the Penghu islands, an archipelago in the Taiwan Strait. The
pool of “citizen judges” first attended a training session on the
procedures for the mock trial as well as an introduction to the
legal system more generally. Only then did they participate in
the mock trial. Even if lay participation is adopted, it is expected
to involve only a small percentage of the population because it
will at least initially be limited to specified serious criminal
cases.
234
Accordingly, as discussed further in Part C below, ob-
taining a clearer understanding of the legal system through di-
rect involvement at trial will be the exception rather than the
norm.
C. Participation
Participation is a theme that runs throughout the Tsai admin-
istration’s initiatives, as seen in the online discussion platform
for direct citizen input on proposed legislation.
235
Taiwan’s Digi-
tal Minister, Audrey Tang, explained, “I would say Taiwan is
233. See, e.g., About, ICIVICS, https://www.icivics.org/about (last visited Apr.
24, 2019) (initiative by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to improve civics educa-
tion: “The practice of democracy is not passed down through the gene pool. It
must be taught and learned anew by each generation of citizens.”).
234. See Guomin Canyu Xingshi Shenpan Caoan Jianbiao (國民參與刑事審判
草案簡表) [Table on the Draft Lay Participation in Criminal Trials], CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION (國民法官)， http://social.judicial.gov.tw/LayJudge/Pro-
moted/Preliminarydraftexplanation (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (explaining
that draft law would apply to crimes for which the lightest punishment is over
seven-years’ imprisonment or where a person dies as a result of an intentional
crime).
235. See Chris Horton, The Simple but Ingenious System Taiwan Uses to
Crowdsource Its Laws, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/s/611816/the-simple-but-ingenious-system-taiwan-uses-to-
crowdsource-its-laws/.
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about civil society learning the functions of the government and,
to a degree, collaborating.”
236
Participation is likewise a third overarching theme in the legal
reform debate: people not only can see and comprehend the legal
system but actually be part of its operation. A range of people
outside of law-trained elites have of course been directly in-
volved in the legal system for years as litigants, witnesses, and
defendants. People in Taiwan also have a limited ability to par-
ticipate in the government’s decision whether to bring charges
because prosecutors must issue a “non-prosecution letter” (“不起
訴書”) when they do not indict, and the complainant, or his fam-
ily, may seek review of the decision.
237
The Criminal Procedure
Code even allows for private prosecutions by alleged crime vic-
tims and, in some situations, family members or agents.
238
These
roles are often not voluntary and, even when some choice is in-
volved, not desirable.
Another current avenue of limited participation is through the
activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Civil soci-
ety actors like the Judicial Reform Foundation
239
and Taiwan
Alliance to End the Death Penalty
240
have long brought atten-
tion to areas that they believe in need of reform. Civil society is,
however, more akin to outsiders who are allowed occasional in-
cursions into the legal system’s ivory tower than ongoing occu-
pants thereof. The government has, for example, included a va-
riety of NGOs in the periodic, self-imposed review process since
Taiwan incorporated the contents of the ICCPR and ICESCR
236. Id. (describing Tang as a “famed hacker who helped the thousands of
Sunflower protesters build and maintain their internal communications net-
work” and now a cabinet-level official focused on digital issues).
237. See Fa Lanke (法蘭客), Jiancha Guan Wei Beigao Bu Qisu Chufen Shi,
Gaosu Ren Youwu Qita Jiuji Tujing? (檢察官為被告不起訴處分時，告訴人有無
其他救濟途徑?) [When the Prosecutor Does Not Indict, What Relief Channels
Does the Complainant Have?], UDN NEWS (聯合新聞網) (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://blog.udn.com/frankbetty/19060050 (explaining options available to com-
plainants when prosecutors decline to bring charges).
238. Criminal Procedure Code, supra note 109, arts. 319²43.
239. Guanyu Women (關於我們) [About Us], JUD. REFORMFOUND. (財團法人民
間司法改革基金會), https://www.jrf.org.tw/about (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
240. Guanyu Women (關於我們) [About Us], TAIWAN ALLIANCE TO END THE
DEATH PENALTY (台灣廢除死刑推動聯盟), http://www.taedp.org.tw/en/about
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
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into domestic law.
241
Nevertheless, this is participation for dis-
crete purposes. It is also participation by a relatively small circle
of social activists.
242
The participation that the current reform
effort seeks to nurture is one that is both more inclusive and sys-
temic. Routinizing involvement of the general citizenry could di-
minish the public perception of the legal system as an aloof ob-
ject that is out of touch with the concerns of the average person
on the street.
One of the 2017 Reform Conference’s slogans was “Multiple
Voices, Participation of All People” (“多元聲音、全民參與”).
243
The very structure of the conference mandated involvement by
requiring that more than fifty percent of each sub-committee’s
members be non-legal experts.
244
This was in stark contrast to
the expert-centric debate at the 1999 Reform Conference. Mem-
bers of the sub-committees for the 2017 Reform Conference in-
cluded human rights activists, writers, doctors, and even family
members of crime victims.
245
These non-legal experts had an
equal vote in the decisions. For the much broader population
who did not directly participate, the Conference website in-
cluded a link for people to leave comments, along with links to
social media sites like Twitter and Facebook.
246
The Judicial
Yuan further created a webpage dedicated to “dialogue” (“對話”)
between the judiciary and public.
247
241. See Chen, Socialization in Isolation, supra note 111, ch. 4, 203²56 (“Tai-
wan’s Self-Established UN-Type Human Rights Treaty Review”).
242. Cf. Yu-jie Chen, Localizing Human Rights Treaty Monitoring: Case
Study of Taiwan as a Non-UN Member State, 35 WIS. INT’L L.J. 277 (2018).
243. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 12.; see also Xinwen
yu Huodong (新聞與活動) [News and Activities], Tuidong Sifa Gaige Touguo
「Duoyuan Shengyin Quanmin Canyu」 Rang Si Gai Wang Qian Maijin (推動
司法改革 透過「多元聲音 全民參與」 讓司改往前邁進) [Promoting Judicial
Reform Through “Multiple Voices, Participation of All People” to Move Judicial
Reform Forward], OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (中華國民,
總統府) (Nov. 25, 2016), http://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/20910.
244. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 12.
245. Fenzu Jieshao (分組介紹) [Sub-Committee Introductions], supra note
153 (links to listings of each sub-committee’s members).
246. You Hua Yao Shuo (有話要說) [Have Something To Say], SIFAGAIGEGUO
SHI HUIYI (司法改革國是會議) [NAT’L AFF. CONF. ON JUD. REFORM], https://jus-
tice.president.gov.tw/opinions/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
247. Sifa Gaige Fangan & Jindu: Si, Sifa yu Shehui Duihua (司法改革 方案
&進度:四，司法與社會對話) [Judicial Reform, Plan &Progress: Four, Dialogue
Between the Judiciary and Society], JUD. YUAN (司法院), http://www.judi-
cial.gov.tw/ten/ten.html#4 (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
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Although the 2017 Reform Conference wrapped up in August
2017, efforts at including public voices in the ongoing reform de-
bate continue. A focal point has been continuing the conference’s
work on lay participation in criminal cases. Discussions regard-
ing some sort of jury system have percolated for decades, in part
because of concerns of lingering bias by judges who have ties to
the authoritarian era.
248
These judges have largely aged out of
the system, but criticism of judges has if anything intensified.
249
The bribery conviction in 2011 of several judges created a new
stain on the judiciary.
250
Strong public backlash against what
was seen as lenient sentencing of a convicted paedophile further
eroded public opinion.
251
In 2015, only 22 percent of respondents
in a government survey agreed with the statement that “most
judges can decide cases independently” and only 38.5 percent
agreed that “judges usually will try to impose appropriate sen-
tences.”
252
In late 2017, the Judicial Yuan released a draft law on using a
mixed bench of professional and lay judges for certain serious
criminal cases.
253
The draft grants lay participants votes with
respect to both guilt and sentencing. In 2018, courts around Tai-
wan held mock trials to test-run the proposed system.
254
The au-
thor of this Article observed mock trials at Taipei, Shihlin, and
248. Cf. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 6 (stating that
“the legal system must go past the shadow of the authoritarian system” “司法
體系必須走出威權體制的陰影”).
249. See Su Yongqin (蘇永欽), supra note 122 (comments by former Vice Pres-
ident of the Judicial Yuan regarding problem of lack of confidence in the judi-
ciary, “司法信任問題”).
250. See Corrupt Judges Handed Lengthy Prison Sentences, supra note 115.
251. See Judges Incur Fury Over Pedophile Sentencing, CHINA POST, Aug. 26,
2010.
252. JUDICIAL YUAN, INTRODUCING LAY PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN, supra note
142.
253. See Jonathan Chin, “Citizen Judges” Bill Drafted by Judicial Yuan,
TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar-
chives/2017/12/01/2003683227. See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Who Shall
Judge? Taiwan’s Exploration of Lay Participation in Criminal Trials, in
TAIWAN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ² A STORY OF TRANSFORMATION
(William P. Alford, Jerome A. Cohen, & Chang-fa Lo eds., 2019). The proposed
system is heavily influenced by the Japanese Saibanin system. Cf.Hans, supra
note 127, at 488²89 (explaining structure of the Japanese system).
254. See, e.g., OuyangMengping (歐陽夢萍), Taibei De Yuan JubanMoni Fat-
ing Guomin Faguan Canyu Shenpan (台北地院舉辦模擬法庭國民法官參與審判)
[Taipei District Court Holds a Mock Trial, Citizen Judges Participate in the
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Penghu District Courts. In Taipei’s Shihlin District Court, more
than 1300 people volunteered to be lay judges in a mock trial.
255
In Taipei District Court, cameras were allowed in the courtroom
for portions of the proceedings as the lay judges were selected
and then participated in the mock trial.
256
At the debriefing con-
ference following the mock trial, each of the six lay judges and
two alternates were asked their opinions on the process.
257
They
gave interviews with the media as well.
258
Also present at the
mock trial was a popular blogger,
259
who, while wearing jeans
and hip sneakers, was asked by the suit-attired judicial officials
for his opinion on the proceedings.
260
At the time of writing, debate about the draft law was ongoing.
The Judicial Yuan has not set a firm timeline for transmission
to the legislature. President Tsai stated at her 2017 National
Day Address that “the Judicial Yuan will accelerate the pace of
reform. . . .”
261
At her 2018 National Day Address, however, she
mentioned transitional justice but did not highlight judicial re-
form.
262
At a separate speech also in October 2018, President
Adjudication], RADIO TAIWAN INT’L (中央廣播電臺) (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://news.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/392654.
255. See Li Zhihua (李志華) & Hu Jingshun (胡景順), Shilin Di Yuan Ban
Moni Fating 1300 Duo Ren Qiang Dang Guomin Faguan (士林地院辦模擬法庭
1300多人搶當國民法官) [Shihlin District Court Holds a Mock Trial, More Than
1300 People Grab Chance to be a Citizen Judge], FTV NEWS (民視新聞) (Feb. 9,
2018), https://news.ftv.com.tw/news/detail/2018209S16M1.
256. Personal Observations at Taipei District Court, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan.
29, 2018) (notes on file with author).
257. Personal Observations at Taipei District Court, in Taipei, Taiwan (Jan.
30, 2018) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Jan. 30, 2018, Personal Ob-
servations].
258. See, e.g., Lin Shuyuan (林淑媛), Guomin Faguan Houxuan Ren Pi Moni
Fating Zuoxiu Bei Yuan: Hehu Guiding (國民法官候選人批模擬法庭作秀北院：
合乎規定) [Candidates for Citizen Judges Approve of Mock Trial Performance,
Taipei District Court, In Accordance with Rules], CENT. NEWS AGENCY (中央通
訊社) (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.cna.com.tw/news/asoc/201802010182.aspx.
259. Tai Ke Juchang TKstory (台客劇場TKstory), YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCghPiQIi_uyjF1YHKj-FhGw/videos (last
visited Apr. 24, 2019).
260. Jan. 30, 2018, Personal Observations, supra note 257.
261. Tsai, 2017 National Day Address, supra note 158.
262. President Tsai Delivers National Day Address, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (Oct. 10, 2018), https://english.presi-
dent.gov.tw/News/5548.
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Tsai reassured that judicial reform was continuing apace.
263
Yet
the introduction of lay judges remains contentious, with one
prominent criticism by proponents of an American-style jury be-
ing that the lay judges will be too easily swayed by the profes-
sional judges’ opinions.
264
The mixed-bench format is, nonethe-
less, more inclusive of lay people’s input than the “trial observa-
tion system” (“觀審制”) considered in the 2000s. That system
would have allowed lay people to express opinions without actu-
ally conferring voting power.
265
The draft law is notable not only
for giving lay people a direct say in the outcome of criminal tri-
als, but also for making sure those lay people are bringing a dis-
tinct viewpoint from the judges: it explicitly excludes lawyers,
law professors, and other members of the legal profession writ
large from serving as “citizen judges.”
266
The six spots are to
bring fresh voices into the courtroom, not amplify the existing
ones.
Speculation continues whether, if the law in some form indeed
passes, greater contact with the legal system will improve peo-
ple’s perceptions. Earlier mock trials held by the Judicial Yuan
involving lay participation painted a largely positive view, even
if people were just interviewed but not then selected to partici-
pate in the mock trial. The Judicial Yuan summarized the goal
263. Tsai Touts Taiwan’s Judicial Reform, Democratic Development, TAIWAN
TODAY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=142587.
264. See, e.g., Zheng Hongda (鄭鴻達), Guomin Faguan Moni Shenpan
Peishen Tuan Xiehui Pi Faguan Gan (國民法官模擬審判 陪審團協會批法官干)
[Citizen Judges Mock Trial, Jury Association Criticizes Judicial Intervention],
LIBERTY TIMESNET (自由時報) (Feb. 1, 2018), http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/poli-
tics/breakingnews/2329268.
265. See GUOMINCANYUXINGSHI SHENPANWANGZHAN (國民參與刑事審判網
站) [WEBSITE FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS], https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20171125151056/http://www.judicial.gov.tw/LayParticipa-
tion/intro08.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
266. Sifa Yuan「Guomin Canyu Xingshi Shenpan Fa Caoan Chugao」 Fabu
Jizhehui Xinwengao (司法院, 「國民參與刑事審判法草案初稿」發布記者會新聞
稿) [Judicial Yuan, Press Release of Press Conference on Release of the “Draft
Law on Citizen Participation in Criminal Adjudications”], SIFAZUIXINDONGTAI
（司法最新動態） (Nov. 30, 2017), http://jirs.judi-
cial.gov.tw/GNNWS/NNWSS002.asp?id=299832.
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of lay participation as “the more involved, the more understand-
ing, thus, the more trust.”
267
Further promising, Japan’s approx-
imately decade-long experience with lay participation in serious
criminal trials has garnered generally positive reviews.
268
The
response to public participation could end up being more mixed.
To borrow a phrase that Mary Gallagher used in her studies of
legal aid plaintiffs in the PRC, perhaps greater participation in
the legal system will foster some form of “informed disenchant-
ment”: “Disenchantment with the promises of the legal system
does not lead to despondency, but to more critical, informed ac-
tion.”
269
Such a complex result short of glowing reviews would
still be a success for Taiwan’s legal system by creating an in-
formed basis for sustained, thoughtful conversations between
the government and citizenry regarding the future path of legal
reforms.
Citizen participation in criminal trials has been the marquee
proposal of the reform debate, but it is far from the only initia-
tive for drawing the public into the legal system. President Tsai
has called for a more inclusive process for evaluating the perfor-
mance of judges and prosecutors, saying these mechanisms will
involve “participation by more external members, increasing
professionalism and impartiality.”
270
Another example is con-
cern for victims’ rights which, although predating President
Tsai’s tenure,
271
has gathered momentum. The 2017 Reform
Conference included victims’ rights as a prominent topic.
272
A
push for greater accessibility is further seen in the Tsai Admin-
istration’s proposal that the Constitutional Court be able to re-
267. JUDICIAL YUAN, INTRODUCING LAY PARTICIPATION IN TAIWAN, supra note
142. But see Su, supra note 169 (cautioning that current reform efforts could
lead to counterproductive results).
268. See Hans, supra note 127, at 488²89 (noting that post-trial surveys of
Saibanin “routinely show citizens have generally very positive responses to
their participation. Scholars have documented broader effects as well; there is
now a great deal more transparency and citizens’ knowledge of the legal system
has increased . . . .”).
269. Mary Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchant-
ment” and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 783
(2006).
270. Tsai, 2017 National Day Address, supra note 158.
271. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 160.
272. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 17²26.
2019] Forging Taiwan’s Legal Identity 541
view final rulings of the courts of last resort in addition to decid-
ing the constitutionality of laws and regulations.
273
If adopted,
this would give citizens a more direct path to a constitutional
ruling.
274
President Tsai has expressed her hope that the reform,
which is modeled on practices used in Germany, will assist jus-
tices in Taiwan “to guide the stable development of our demo-
cratic constitutional order and to protect the constitutional
rights of our people in a more effective and comprehensive man-
ner.”
275
Another facet to the conversation about more diverse partici-
pation in the legal system is renewed attention on proposals to
broaden the way that judges and prosecutors are selected.
276
Lawyers have for over a decade been able to become judges and
prosecutors, though the path is cumbersome and of questionable
desirability when viewed from both financial and prestige per-
spectives.
277
Encouraging more seasoned lawyers to shift from
private practice to the bench is one way of countering criticism
of young “baby” (“娃娃”) judges, so pejoratively labelled because
of their selection often straight out of school without diverse life
experience.
278
273. See President Tsai’s Remarks at 2018 International Conference on Con-
stitutional Court and Human Rights Protection, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REP.
OFCHINA (TAIWAN) (Oct. 1, 2018), https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/5534.
For an explanation of the constitutional court’s current powers, see YEH, supra
note 105, at 162²65.
274. See Tsai Touts Taiwan’s Judicial Reform, Democratic Development, su-
pra note 263.
275. President Tsai’s Remarks at 2018 International Conference on Constitu-
tional Court and Human Rights Protection, supra note 273.
276. For a look at the composition of Taiwan’s judiciary in a comparative per-
spective, see Neil Chisholm, The Faces of Judicial Independence: Democratic
Versus Bureaucratic Accountability in Judicial Selection, Training, and Pro-
motion in South Korea and Taiwan, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 893 (2014).
277. See Sifa Yuan Linxuan Lüshi, Jiaoshou, Fujiaoshou, Zhuli Jiaoshou
Zhuan Ren Fayuan Faguan Shencha Banfa (司法院遴選律師,教授,副教授,助理
教授轉任法院法官審查辦法) [Judicial Yuan Examination Methods for Selection
of Lawyers, Professors, Associate Professors, Assistant Professors, and Lectur-
ers to Transfer and Become Court Judges] (promulgated by the Judicial Yuan,
Nov. 6, 2006) (Taiwan), available at https://law.moj.gov.tw/Law-
Class/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0020152.
278. See, e.g., Wang Hongshun (王宏舜), Jianshao 「Wawa Faguan」 Weilai
Faguan, Jiancha Guan Yao Xianguo Wuguan (減少「娃娃法官」 未來法官, 檢
察官要先過五關) [Decrease Future “Baby Judges,” Prosecutors Must Pass Five
Levels], UDN NEWS (聯合新聞網) (Apr. 15, 2017),
https://udn.com/news/story/9939/2404493 (criticizing “baby judges”); see also
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In sum, the various initiatives seek to mitigate the pronounced
“us” (legal elites) versus “them” (general public) dichotomy by
infusing outside voices into the everyday workings of the legal
system. This process is not an unqualified good, as there are
valid concerns that calling for “people’s justice” (“人民的司法”)
279
could fuel populist sentiments and diminish the judiciary’s role
as the protector of rights of even unpopular defendants.
280
While
bearing the potential pitfalls in mind, there is much to celebrate
in the legal reform debate. There is also the possibility that re-
sulting changes could have implications beyond the confines of
the legal system. The common enterprise of understanding and
even contributing to the workings of the legal system has the
potential to become a facet of what it means to be Taiwanese.
D. From Legal Identity to Taiwanese Identity
Legal reforms in Taiwan are very much a work in progress.
While no legal system exists in an entirely static state, Taiwan
is experiencing a time of significant flux. It is uncertain what
characteristics will ultimately define the legal system in Tai-
wan, but there is palpable momentum to weave the principles of
transparency, clarity, and participation into its fabric. Today,
people in Taiwan can vote for their president, legislative repre-
sentatives, and a host of local offices.
281
Yet they have little un-
derstanding of, let alone direct say in, the workings of the legal
system.
This Article is not endorsing electing judges via popular vote,
which Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sagely warned can make
2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 51²59 (discussing pro-
posals to diversify channels for people to become judges and prosecutors as well
as changes to training). Despite the criticism of the youth of some professional
judges, the draft law on citizen participation allows people as young as twenty-
three years old to serve as lay judges.
279. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 8.
280. Cf. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995).
281. See Political System, supra note 80; Kevin Hsu,HowDoes Taiwan’s Par-
liamentary Election Work, KETAGALANMEDIA (Dec. 26, 2015), http://www.ket-
agalanmedia.com/2015/12/26/how-does-taiwans-parliamentary-election-
work/. The most recent elections for local officials were held in November 2018.
Tsai Ing-wen will be up for reelection in 2020, at which time members of the
Legislative Yuan will also be elected.
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judges no more than “politicians in robes.”
282
Nor is it claiming
that judges, prosecutors, and other officials in the legal system³
particularly those with life tenure³do not care about the
broader citizenry. It is positing that the stark barriers between
the public and the legal system have encouraged a rift that in
turn has created at least the perception of a one-way street in
which the system acts upon people but does not seriously con-
sider their views. Brian Hioe explained in New Bloom³an
online magazine founded by a group of students and activists³
that “calls for judicial reform probably return to the widespread
sense that laws in Taiwan [are] something outside of the reach
of the public and that, in this way, Taiwan’s legal system is
widely seen as undemocratic.”
283
The reform efforts discussed in
Parts III A²C above seek in various ways to change both the per-
ception and, to at least a certain extent, the reality that Taiwan’s
legal system has been aloof from the people to which it applies.
If reforms result in people feeling more connected with the le-
gal system, this can lay a foundation for an ongoing integration
of public feedback into its operations and development. This pro-
cess could stir a change in “legal consciousness,” explained by
Sally Merry as “a term developed to describe the way individuals
experience and understand the law and its relevance to their
lives.”
284
A shift in consciousness from the legal system as some-
thing generally outside of what it means to be Taiwanese to one
of many facets of a common experience could help foster a chang-
ing collective identity. The U.S. Congressional Research Service
explains, “President Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party em-
braces a strong Taiwanese identity.”
285
In English, the word
282. John Schwartz, Effort Begun to End Voting for Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24judges.html; see also Ger-
ald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of
State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1133, 1133 (1997) (comparing a judge’s awareness of reelection to having
a crocodile in your bathtub that cannot be ignored); see generally Michael S.
Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L. REV.
929 (2016) (arguing that decisions become more hostile to criminal defendants
as attack advertising increases).
283. Brian Hioe, Challenges of Judicial Reform Facing the Tsai Administra-
tion Behind Recent Controversy, NEW BLOOMMAG. (May 4, 2017), https://new-
bloommag.net/2017/05/04/ judicial-reform-tsai/.
284. Merry, supra note 15, at 51.
285. LAWRENCE&MORRISON, supra note 6, at 42.
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“identity” conveys both the concept of the distinguishing charac-
teristics of an entity
286
and the “process by which a set of indi-
viduals interacts to create a shared sense of identity or group
consciousness.”
287
In Chinese, different characters express these
distinct concepts:
288
(1) distinguishing characteristics of a thing
and (2) a sense of group consciousness.
What is beyond the scope of this Article³and what is ripe for
sociologists, social anthropologists, and experts in other fields to
explore³is an in-depth analysis of how changes to the legal sys-
tem could connect to the conception of identity in the latter sense
of a shared conception of what it means to be “Taiwanese.” Will
the experience of reading more accessible judicial writings, of
watching clips of court arguments on television, of seeing car-
toons explaining laws, and of sitting together as lay judges be
one more strand that binds people together as not just living in
geographic proximity, but also as being engaged in a shared en-
terprise?
289
Will the citizenry develop a collective sense of expec-
tation that their opinions will be heard and heeded by actors
working in the legal system? Going a step further, will they feel
a growing sense of common pride that³despite persisting short-
comings³they live in a place where their voices are not
squelched by the legal system but rather help shape that sys-
tem?
The question of what ingredients will contribute to Taiwanese
identity is of particular importance in part because debates
about “identity” pervade political discussions in Taiwan. As
Shelley Rigger observed, “Students of Taiwan domestic politics
286. Identity, supra note 14.
287. Angie Andriot & Timothy J. Owens, Identity, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756384/obo-
9780199756384-0025.xml (last modified Apr. 24, 2012).
288. The characteristics of an entity are best expressed as its特色 or特質. In
the context of collective Taiwanese identity, the better phrasing is認同, which
conveys a meeting of minds.
289. The idea of how law connects with “place” is even more complex in Tai-
wan than other jurisdictions because of the contested nature of “Taiwan.” Cf.
Legrand, supra note 140, at 101²02 (When discussing “locatedness”: “Law
emerges only in and through place. . . . Law and place are inextricably en-
meshed, which means, incidentally, that law can be constitutive of place in its
turn. . . .”).
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have identified national identity as the primary cleavage shap-
ing public opinion and driving political allegiance.”
290
People
generally agree that identity is an important issue for Taiwan
but disagree as to the current state of affairs. What it means to
be “Taiwanese” versus “Chinese” or some combination of both is
tough to pin down. Surveys trying to measure identity are not
surprisingly notoriously fraught. This is in part because identity
is not a binary choice.
291
It is also due to varying interpretations
about what terms mean: to ask someone if she is “Chinese” can
carry ethnic, cultural, and national implications. These different
usages are more easily expressed in Chinese than English,
though, even in Chinese, terminology is subject to idiosyncratic
understandings by the people being polled.
Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) period-
ically surveys people on the following question: “In Taiwan, some
people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people
who think that they are Chinese. Do you consider yourself as
Taiwanese, Chinese or both?”
292
The long-term trend following
democratization was an uptick in Taiwanese identity.
293
This
was followed by a modest decline,
294
but Nathan Batto cautioned
in 2017 about over-interpreting those results: “For now, my
working hypothesis is that long-term drivers of Taiwanese iden-
tity are still in place. Younger people identify more strongly as
Taiwanese than older people, and this is driven by education and
290. Shelley Rigger, The China Impact on Taiwan’s Generational Politics, in
TAIWAN AND THE ¶CHINA IMPACT’ 70, 70 (Gunter Schubert ed., 2016) (disentan-
gling the various “identity elements” (e.g., ethnicity, partisanship, etc.) and
supporting a more nuanced approach).
291. In addition, how people in Taiwan self-identify is a distinct question
from their views on cross-strait relations, specifically whether there should be
unification with the PRC. See, e.g., Matthew Strong, Referendum About Tai-
wan Independence of Unification Should be Allowed: Poll, TAIWANNEWS (Jan.
1, 2018), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3339102; Yan-ling Chiu &
Jonathan Chin,Majority Reject Unification: Poll, TAIPEITIMES (May 31, 2016),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/31/2003647521.
292. Nathan Batto, The State of (Out of Date) Public Opinion, FROZENGARLIC
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://frozengarlic.wordpress.com/2017/09/26/the-state-of-
out-of-date-public-opinion/.
293. Id.
294. See Dongtao Qi, Why is Taiwanese Nationalism Declining?, IPP REV.
(Feb. 13, 2018), http://ippreview.com/index.php/Blog/single/id/650.html
(“Tsai’s moderate and pragmatic stance on cross-strait relations might have
produced a moderate and pragmatic trend in Taiwanese nationalism.”).
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real-world experiences in which China clumsily continually re-
minds Taiwanese that they are a different group of people.”
295
Robust public interaction with Taiwan’s legal system, which is
increasingly distinct from that of the PRC as further explained
in Part IV below, has the power to become a starker indicator
that people in Taiwan “are a different group of people.”
For Taiwan’s youth, if reforms are accompanied by expanded
education efforts, thenmovement towards an inclusive, dynamic
legal system could have a greater impact on their sense of what
it means to be Taiwanese. As noted above, how to teach children
about the government is a politically sensitive task. It is fre-
quently said that the youth of Taiwan are “naturally independ-
ent” (“天然獨” or “自然獨”)
296
by virtue of growing up in a democ-
racy that is protective of civil and political rights.
297
That said,
stagnating wages and broader questions about Taiwan’s eco-
nomic and political future have added another layer to the de-
bate: there are indications of a “brain drain” from Taiwan to the
PRC.
298
Working in the PRC does not mean losing ties with Tai-
wan, especially because frequent flights across the strait make
it so people can work regularly on one side but still spend sub-
stantial time on the other.
299
Nonetheless, economic reliance on
295. Batto, supra note 292; see also Fang-Yu Chen et al., The Taiwanese See
Themselves as Taiwanese, Not as Chinese, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://wapo.st/2FxUfp2 (examining trends in self-identification and finding
that “ROC residents increasingly identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese”).
296. Marie-Alice McLean-Dreyfus, Taiwan: Is There a Political Generation
Gap?, INTERPRETER (June 9, 2017), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-inter-
preter/taiwan-there-political-generation-gap; see also Szu-chien Hsu, Presi-
dent, Taiwan Found. for Democracy, A Political Profile of Taiwan’s Youth:
Democratic Support, Natural Independence, and Commitment to Defense,
Presentation Before the Global Taiwan Institute in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 3, 2018),
in Details and Presentation About the TFD Survey on the Taiwanese Young
People’s Political Attitudes Released, TAIWAN FOUND. DEMOCRACY,
http://www.tfd.org.tw/opencms/english/events/data/Event0680.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2019) (report by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy concluding
that “[t]he essence of ¶natural independence’ actually is ¶anti-unification’”).
297. For a critique of the current human rights situation in Taiwan, see
AMNESTY INT’L, TAIWAN: GOVERNMENT MUST ACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW
(2017), available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/docu-
ments/asa38/5531/2017/en/.
298. Rebecca Lin, The DPP’s True Rival: Xi Jinping, COMMONWEALTHMAG.
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=1796.
299. Cross-strait flights have, however, become an issue with increasing
cross-strait tension. See Chris Horton, Taiwan Retaliates Against Chinese Air-
lines, Hampering Lunar New Year Travel, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018),
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China is seen as a factor that could work to erode Taiwanese
identity.
A number of factors beyond age influence the identity of people
who call Taiwan home. Though Taiwan’s population is predomi-
nantly ethnically Han Chinese
300
who can trace their heritage
across the Taiwan Strait, this group roughly divides into those
whose ancestors came with the Nationalists after World War II
(外省人) and those who were already in Taiwan (本省人).
301
The
Han Chinese population can also be broken down into further
subcomponents, such as based on the distinction between Holo
and Hakka people.
302
Part of Taiwan’s current population can
trace their lineage back to the original indigenous inhabit-
ants.
303
Today there are sixteen officially recognized indigenous
groups.
304
The Dutch and Japanese colonial periods brought ad-
ditional layers of diversity.
305
Add to this landscape that, partic-
ularly in light of demographic trends, the government is making
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/asia/taiwan-airlines-lunar-new-
year.html.
300. See People: Fact Focus, TAIWAN.GOV.TW, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/con-
tent_2.php (last visited May 24, 2019) (explaining “Taiwan may be described
as a predominantly Han Chinese society, with more than 95 percent of the
population claiming Han ancestry”); see also Razib Khan, The World’s Largest
Ethnic Group: Han Chinese, from North to South, MEDIUM (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://blog.insito.me/the-worlds-largest-ethnic-group-han-chinese-from-
north-to-south-e509d66db58d (“The ethnogenesis of the Han dates to the first
millennium B.C.³as the Zhou dynasty took the helm from the Shang dyn-
asty.”).
301. Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang &Mau-Kuei Chang,Understanding the Nu-
ances of Waishengren, CHINA PERSP., Sept. 15, 2010, at 108.
302. The Republic of China Yearbook 2016: Geography & Demographics,
EXEC. YUAN, REP. OF CHINA (TAIWAN) (2016), https://eng-
lish.ey.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=1082F2A7077508A4.
303. See Linda van der Horst, The Evolution of Taiwanese Identity, DIPLOMAT
(June 10, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-evolution-of-taiwanese-
identity/.
304. Introduction to the Tribes, HUALIEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES DEPT.,
http://ab.hl.gov.tw/en-us/Explore/Ethnic_GroupIntro (last visited Apr. 24,
2019).
305. See J. Bruce Jacobs, Taiwan’s Colonial Experiences and the Development
of Ethnic Identities: Some Hypotheses, TAIWANCOMP. PERSP., July 2014, at 47²
59.
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a push to create an “immigrant-friendly” environment that wel-
comes new people to Taiwan.
306
This is all to say that the forces shaping Taiwanese identity
are varied and complex, and Taiwan is a more diverse place than
often recognized. Going forward, what this Article first recom-
mends watching is whether an enhanced, communal connection
to the legal system becomes a bit of the glue that binds people
together despite variations in ethnicity, age, gender, sexual ori-
entation, socio-economic status, political views, and other iden-
tifying personal characteristics. And, second, enhanced atten-
tion is warranted regarding what forces are at work in creating
strands among the citizenry and legal system: government ac-
tors aiming to bolster popular support and/or out of a sincere
belief that a more responsive legal system is best for Taiwan;
civil society groups seeking to help shape the legal system and,
in turn, further the causes that they support; academics hoping
to nudge the legal system from its somewhat muddled state to-
wards whatever they may see as the better path for Taiwan;
and/or average people on the street because they are invested in
the future of the place they call home and they see their opinions
as bettering the odds for its success.
IV. AUDIENCES BEYOND BORDERS: THE REWARDS AND RISK OF A
TAIWANESE LEGAL IDENTITY
What form Taiwan’s legal identity will take is of primary in-
terest to those who will live under that system. It is also of in-
terest to comparative law scholars who have long debated the
prospects and perils of legal transplants as well as how external
inspiration can combine with internal innovations.
307
Because of
the geopolitical implications, Taiwan’s domestic legal develop-
ments have significance to outside audiences beyond the arcane
world of legal academia.
On the one hand, there are potential soft-power rewards in
demonstrating to the world how Taiwan is a thriving democracy
306. Shih Hsiu-chuan, Taiwan to Review Immigration Policy to Attract Tal-
ents, FOCUS TAIWAN (Nov. 10, 2017), http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201711100029.aspx; see also Sinclair Prowse, Tai-
wan’s Growing Multiculturalism, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 5, 2015), https://thediplo-
mat.com/2015/02/taiwans-growing-multiculturalism/.
307. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
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that is actively incorporating the citizenry into its formerly au-
thoritarian government (Part IV.A). On the other hand, there is
the risk that celebrating a transformation of the legal system
into a more inclusive, dynamic entity might be seen by Beijing
as an element of de-Sinicization and pro-Taiwanization (Part
IV.B). A push to distance the legal system from its traditional
ROC roots is a far cry from an official declaration of hard inde-
pendence (e.g., a proclamation of the establishment of the “Re-
public of Taiwan”); however, the PRC government has also
voiced its firm resistance to moves that it sees as contributing to
“soft independence” (e.g., cultivating a sense of distinctive Tai-
wanese identity even if stopping short of announcing official for-




Taiwan is an energetic, sometimes to the point of raucous, de-
mocracy. In 2018, the national holiday commemorating the
harsh repression following the 1947 “228 Incident”
309
saw pro-
testers splashing red paint on Chiang Kai-shek’s tomb and “two
former presidents call[ing] for a referendum in April 2019 on
whether to replace the Republic of China . . . with a Republic of
Taiwan.”
310
This exuberance can make governing challenging,
though President Tsai has repeatedly hailed these hard-won
gains: “[F]reedom and democracy Taiwan enjoys today is not a
matter of course. Freedom is not a given and democracy is not a
gift from rulers. Everything we have today was won by the strug-
gles of Taiwanese . . . .”
311
Foreign governments have praised Taiwan’s free atmosphere
as well. For example, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, David Helvey,
308. See J. Michael Cole, Chinese Warns of ‘Soft’ and ‘Insidious’ Taiwan In-
dependence Forces, NEWS LENS (July 27, 2016), https://international.the-
newslens.com/article/45216.
309. See Horton, Taiwan Commemorates a Violent Nationalistic Episode, su-
pra note 181.
310. Chris Horton, In Taiwan, Young Protesters and Ex-Presidents Chafe
Against China, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/02/28/world/asia/taiwan-chiang-kai-shek.html.
311. Chen Wei-han, DPP to Mark 30 Years Since End of Martial Law, TAIPEI
TIMES (July 13, 2017), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar-
chives/2017/07/13/2003674448.
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said in September 2017 that Taiwan is “a model for the region
and the world with its market economy and its vibrant, prosper-
ous, free, and orderly democratic society.”
312
In October 2018,
U.S. Vice PresidentMike Pence stated that “America will always
believe that Taiwan’s embrace of democracy shows a better path
for all the Chinese people.”
313
The former head of the European
Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan praised that “[t]he EU and
Taiwan are very close from the perspectives of a democratic so-
ciety and economic development[,]”
314
and the Canadian govern-
ment sent a congratulatory message to President Tsai on her
election victory affirming that “Taiwanese and Canadians share
similar values with regard to democracy, freedom and human
rights.”
315
Current efforts to break down barriers between the people and
the legal system add another layer to Taiwan’s story of dedica-
tion to democracy and the rule of law. That Taiwan’s developing
legal identity is one facet of this story is largely unknown outside
Taiwan. Based on the author’s experience, many foreigners in
Taiwan are also unaware of the debate.
316
In part this is under-
standable because meetings where people discuss the legal sys-
tem do not grab international headlines like street protests and
other more colorful displays of civil and political rights. Moreo-
ver, because the workings of the legal system are of most imme-
diate concern to domestic audiences, it makes sense that the gov-
ernment would focus messaging internally.
312. David Helvey, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Upgrading U.S.²Taiwan Relations for the
21st Century, Remarks at the Global Taiwan Institute, Wash., D.C. (Sept. 14,
2017), available at http://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ASD-
Prepared-Remarks-for-GTI-Annual-Symposium-FINAL.pdf.
313. Michael Richard Pence, U.S. Vice President, Remarks on the Admin-
istration’s Policy Toward China at the Hudson Institute, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 4,
2018), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.
314. EU Representative Praises Taiwan Democracy, TAIWAN TODAY (Aug. 10,
2015), https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,23&post=3723 (quoting head
of European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan).
315. Canada Congratulates Tsai on Elections, GOV’T CANADA (Jan. 17, 2016),
http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/taiwan/news-nouvelles/2016/01-17-
elections.aspx?lang=eng.
316. Outside of the academic interests of foreign legal scholars, most foreign-
ers would like to avoid contact with Taiwan’s legal system. Cf. Raleigh Holmes,
Volunteers Needed to Visit Taoyuan Prisoner for Foreigners, CENTER (Dec. 7,
2016), https://www.communitycenter.org.tw/volunteers-needed/.
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Taiwan’s government has struggled to burnish its interna-
tional reputation as a defender of human rights, rule of law, and
democracy. Events unfolding while completing this Article sug-
gest, however, that this might be changing. The May 2019 intro-
duction of same-sex marriage stands out as an example of when
foreign attention focused on Taiwan’s domestic legal affairs. The
Constitutional Court ruled on May 24, 2017, that the ROC Con-
stitution required the government to permit same sex mar-
riage.
317
The Court gave the legislature two years to pass legis-
lation implementing this decision; otherwise, same-sex couples
would by default be able to register their marriages.
318
The road
to May 24, 2019, was politically bumpy,
319
but the legislature fi-
nally passed a bill one-week shy of the deadline.
320
The news³
especially that these would be the first same-sex marriages in
Asia³received international acclaim
321
and even prompted a
celebratory Tweet from Ellen DeGeneres to her 77.7 million fol-
lowers.
322
President Tsai responded, “Thank you, Ellen! I am
proud to serve this country where #LoveWins, so everyone has
the right to marry. Everyone!”
323
What is uncertain at the time of writing is whether Taiwan
can harness this momentum to increase its presence on the in-
ternational stage. Certainly, photos of happy couples more easily
capture media attention than debates about judicial reforms.
317. See Press Release, supra note 105.
318. Id.
319. See Batto, The Politics of the Marriage Equality Vote, supra note 135.
320. See Austin Ramzy, Taiwan’s Legislature Approves Asia’s First Same-Sex
Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/05/17/world/asia/taiwan-gay-marriage.html.
321. See, e.g., Chris Horton, After A Long Fight, Taiwan’s Same-Sex Couples
Celebrate New Marriages, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/05/24/world/asia/taiwan-same-sex-marriage.html; Ralph Jen-
nings,Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Marry in Taiwan on First Day It’s Legal,
L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-taiwan-
gay-same-sex-marriage-20190524-story.html; William Yang, ‘I Feel Lucky’:
Taiwan Holds First Gay Marriages in Historic Day For Asia, GUARDIAN (May
24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/24/taiwan-holds-
first-gay-marriages-in-historic-day-for-asia.
322. Ellen DeGeneres (@TheEllenShow), TWITTER (May 23, 2019, 6:53 PM),
https://twitter.com/TheEllenShow/status/1131740052172750848 (“Taiwan is
now the first Asian country to allow marriage equality. Let’s celebrate every
step in the right direction.”).
323. 蔡英文 Tsai Ing-wen (@iingwen), TWITTER (May 24, 2019, 4:26 AM),
https://twitter.com/iingwen/status/1131884081547866112.
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The challenge is how to use the positive exposure from the same-
sex marriage success to amplify Taiwan’s “soft power” in the
sense of “harness[ing] the allure of culture and values to add to
a country’s strength. . . .”
324
The upcoming 2020 presidential and
legislative election is the next obvious event for Taiwan to turn
world attention to its democratic achievements.
325
Yet freedom
is not just gauged by periodic free elections, but also by the many
ways that the government exerts its coercive power over individ-
uals. That Taiwan is examining how to make the legal system
more transparent, clear, and participatory is a new chapter in
Taiwan’s casting off of its authoritarian past. Wide projection of
this story is not something that the government can achieve sin-
glehandedly. Even if the government hones its messaging for for-
eign audiences, it will rely heavily on the media (both domestic
and international), civil society, and individual citizens to con-
tinue transmitting those messages abroad once the excitement
about marriage equality fades.
Nor is Taiwan’s legal journey always going to be as joyous as
in the wake of the same-sex marriage law’s passage. The process
of forging Taiwan’s legal identity is complex. It remains uncer-
tain at what pace the process of grappling with legal issues will
result in increased substantive protections for human rights.
The death penalty, for example, remains widely popular, and
President Tsai largely avoided commenting on this controversial
issue during her campaign and initial two years in office.
326
In
August 2018, her administration carried out its first execution,
with the deputy justice minister commenting, “Abolishing (the)
death sentence is an international trend and a long-term goal for
the justice ministry . . . but there is no consensus in our country.
. . .”
327
324. What to Do About China’s “Sharp Power”, ECONOMIST (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21732524-china-manipulating-deci-
sion-makers-western-democracies-best-defence. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE,
JR., SOFT POWER, THEMEANS TO SUCCESS INWORLD POLITICS (2004).
325. Presidential, Legislative Elections to be Held Concurrently in 2020,
FOCUS TAIWAN (Jan. 31. 2019), http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201901310018.aspx.
326. See Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s Enduring Death Penalty, EAST ASIA
FORUM (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/11/01/taiwans-en-
during-death-penalty/.
327. Taiwan Carries Out First Execution in Two Tears, STRAITS TIMES (Sept.
1, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-carries-out-first-
execution-in-two-years (first alteration in original).
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Similarly, despite calls for a more inclusive society that wel-
comes foreigners,
328
a draft refugee law has long been stalled in
the legislature.
329
If, however, a more inclusive legal system
leads to greater attention on how the system treats fundamental
freedoms, this could in turn encourage even greater compliance
with the ICCPR, ICESCR, and other international human rights
treaties that Taiwan has incorporated into domestic law. For in-
stance, the disproportionate number of male lay-judges was
raised at the conference following the Taipei District Court’s
mock trial in January 2018.
330
That there were only two women
in this particular case was a result of random selection, not in-
tentional discrimination. The observation, however, led to dis-
cussion about the pros and cons of explicitly taking gender di-
versity into consideration.
331
Such conversations are an entrée
into a deeper discussion about how the legal system can both
support and undermine human rights. And showing these dis-
cussions to the world adds data points regarding Taiwan’s com-
mitment to these rights.
Drawing attention to Taiwan’s legal reform efforts can further
evidence the yawning gap with the situation across the strait.
332
President Xi Jinping has moved to consolidate his power and has
328. The Tsai Administration has proposed legislation to attract skilled pro-
fessionals from overseas. See Liu Meng-chun, New Immigration Act a Positive
Step, TAIPEI TIMES (May 22, 2018), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editori-
als/archives/2018/05/22/2003693485.
329. See Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan: A Refuge Without a Refugee Law,
TAIWAN INSIGHT (June 4, 2019), https://taiwaninsight.org/2019/06/04/taiwan-a-
refuge-without-a-refugee-law/; Opinion: It’s Time for Taiwan to Act on Refugee
Protection, NEWS LENS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://international.the-
newslens.com/article/104517.
330. Jan. 30, 2018, Personal Observations, supra note 257.
331. Cf. Deborah L. Forman,What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury
Selection, 2 UCLAWOMEN’SL.J. 35 (1992); see alsoMiki Caul Kittilson, In Sup-
port of Gender Quotas: Setting New Standards, Bringing Visible Gains, 1 POL.
& GENDER 638 (2005).
332. See, for example, Weitseng Chen’s response to the “convergence theory”
(that China might follow Taiwan’s developmental path): “[T]his Article argues
that China is unlikely, despite the striking similarities between the two sides,
to follow Taiwan’s trajectory of the rule of law transition that eventually facil-
itated the transformation of an authoritarian regime into a full-fledged democ-
racy.” Chen, Twins of Opposites, supra note 81, at 485.
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engaged in “increasingly repressive and arbitrary govern-
ment”
333
that is starkly seen in the ongoing arbitrary detention
of approximately a million Uighurs and members of other Mus-
lim minority groups.
334
Intense censorship of political debate in-
cludes blocking Winnie the Pooh images because of their past
use in mocking President Xi.
335
Compare this squelching of free
expression with President Tsai’s remarks when opening a book
fair in Taipei: “¶Why is Asia’s most important book fair held in
Taiwan?’ Because we have a democratic political system, a free
society and because a diversity of positions and voices can be
found in this land, stirring creativity.”
336
Diverse opinions stir-
ring creativity in the forging of Taiwan’s legal identity presents
an additional point of differentiation to show the world.
B. Soft Independence
The term “existential threat” has become cliché, but people in
Taiwan indeed live with the threat that Beijing will perma-
nently change the way that they are governed and will do so
against their will.
337
Tensions are high across the Taiwan Strait.
President Tsai has angered Beijing by not endorsing the “One
China Principle” or related so-called “1992 Consensus.”
338
The
333. Jerome A. Cohen, China is Likely to Enter Another Long Period of Severe
Dictatorship, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-likely-enter-another-long-period-severe-dicta-
torship; see also Richard McGregor et al., Xi Won’t Go, CHINAFILE (Feb. 25,
2018), http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/xi-wont-go.
334. See, e.g., Jessica Batke,Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions
in Xinjiang’s Camps Come From?, CHINAFILE (Jan. 8, 2019), http://www.china-
file.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figure-detentions-
xinjiangs-camps-come; Stephanie Nebehay, 1.5 Million Muslims Could Be De-
tained in China’s Xinjiang: Academic, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://reut.rs/2Gu0wmf.
335. See Josh Rudolph, Sensitive Words: Xi to Ascend His Throne (Updated),
CHINA DIGITAL TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://chinadig-
italtimes.net/2018/02/sensitive-words-emperor-xi-jinping-ascend-throne/.
336. Christie Chen, President Opens Book Fair Lauding Taiwan’s Diversity,
Freedom, CHINA POST (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://chinapost.nownews.com/20180206-224813.
337. Phil Walter, What is an Existential Threat?, REAL CLEAR DEF. (Feb. 9,
2016), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/02/10/what_is_an_exis-
tential_threat_109009.html.
338. LAWRENCE & MORRISON, supra note 6, at 42²44 (explaining “1992 Con-
sensus” and its relation to the “idea that Taiwan andmainland China are parts
of ¶one China’”).
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latter served as a construct to facilitate cross-strait relations
during the previous KMT-led administration, but it is not a bind-
ing agreement.
339
It only gained the name “1992 Consensus”
when then Chairman of the KMT, Su Chi, coined the term in
2000.
340
The “1992 Consensus” is incompatible with the DPP’s
charter,
341
and President Tsai has been unwavering in her rejec-
tion of it as a framework for cross-strait relations.
342
Beijing has
taken a number of actions to press the Tsai administration to
change its stance,
343
such as establishing diplomatic relations
with several ROC allies
344
and blocking Taiwan’s attendance at
the World Health Assembly.
345
President Xi stressed a stern approach towards Taiwan during
his address at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October
339. Id. at 38 (“The term referred to an agreement reportedly reached during
meetings in November 1992 between two semi-official organizations, the PRC’s
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF).”); see also Chun-I Chien, Legal Aspects of
Mutual Non-Denial and the Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, 27 MD. J.
INT’L L. 111, 118 (2012) (explaining how President Ma’s use of “mutual non-
denial” was “effective in moving Taiwan and Mainland China toward closer
cultural, social, trade, and investment ties”).
340. See Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen, China-Taiwan Relations Re-Ex-
amined: The “1992 Consensus” and Cross-Strait Agreements, 14 U. PA. ASIAN
L. REV. 1, 9 (2019).
341. Richard C. Bush, Cross-Strait Relations: Not a One-Way Street,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2016/04/22/cross-strait-relations-not-a-one-way-street/ (“[Tsai] is the
leader of the [DPP], which 25 years ago stated the clear objective creating a
Republic of Taiwan³in effect, Taiwan independence. That objective is still in
the party’s charter, but only a small majority of the island’s public shares that
goal . . . .”).
342. See Shannon Tiezzi, Facing Chinese Pressure, Taiwan’s President Tsai
Seeks ‘Survival Niche’, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 10, 2018), https://thediplo-
mat.com/2018/10/facing-chinese-pressure-taiwans-president-tsai-seeks-sur-
vival-niche/ (noting “Tsai’s refusal to overtly embrace the ¶1992 Consensus’”).
343. Mainland Spokesman Says Cross-Strait CommunicationMechanisms in
Suspension, XINHUA NET (June 26, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish/2016-06/26/c_135466191.htm.
344. Richard Bernstein et al., The World is Deserting Taiwan. How Should
the U.S. Respond?, CHINAFILE (June 14, 2017), http://www.chinafile.com/con-
versation/world-deserting-taiwan-how-should-us-respond.
345. Chris Horton, Blocked by China, Taiwan Presses to Join U.N. Agency’s
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/05/08/world/asia/taiwan-world-health-china-.html.
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2017,
346
vowing to defeat independence “in any form.”
347
In Feb-
ruary 2018, the CCP “affirmed the continuation of Beijing’s two-
pronged ¶soft-hard’ strategy of using both hard and soft
measures against Taiwan[,]” i.e., using carrots and sticks.
348
That big sticks may someday be used is explicit in PRC law. The
2005 PRC Anti-Secession Law states the goal of “peaceful reuni-
fication” but further outlines the conditions for use of “non-
peaceful means”:
In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist
forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the
fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents
entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that
possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely
exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and
other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
349
It would be a jaw-dropping surprise if President Tsai chose the
road of hard independence by declaring establishment of the
“Republic of Taiwan,” although that phrasing is in the DPP’s
Charter.
350
Even President Tsai’s more subtle moves are raising
the PRC leadership’s ire. As Alan Romberg noted in September
2017, “Attention to ¶cultural independence’ has risen on the
Mainland’s list of concerns about ¶soft independence.’”
351
Follow-
ing President Tsai’s inauguration in May 2016, a PRC-state-run
346. Richard C. Bush,What Xi Jinping Said About Taiwan at the 19th Party
Congress, BROOKINGS (Oct. 19, 2017), https://brook.gs/2Fzfzu0 [hereinafter
Bush, What Xi Jinping Said About Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress].
347. Xi Vows Resolve, Ability to Defeat ‘Taiwan Independence’, CHINA DAILY
(Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcon-
gress/2017-10/18/content_33404680.htm.
348. Russell Hsiao, CCP Central Committee’s 2018 Taiwan Affairs Meeting
Affirms Xi’s “Soft-Hard” Approach, GLOBAL TAIWAN INST. (Feb. 21, 2018),
http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/02/21-gtb-3-4/.
349. Fan Fenlie Guojia Fa (反分裂國家法) [Anti-Secession Law], (promul-
gated by Presidential Decree No. 34, Mar. 14, 2005, effective Mar. 14, 2005),
art. 8 (China), translated in Constitution and the Related Laws: Anti-Secession
Law, NAT’L PEOPLE’SCONG. OF THE PEOPLE’SREP. OFCHINA (全國人民代表大會),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384099.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2019).
350. See LAWRENCE&MORRISON, supra note 6, at 4.
351. Alan D. Romberg, Cross-Strait Relations: Skepticism Abounds, CHINA
LEADERSHIPMONITOR, Sept. 2017, at 3. A different framing for an emphasis on
distinct Taiwanese culture is “Taiwanization.” See, e.g., Zhong, supra note 21,
at 348.
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newspaper opined, “What can be assured is that DPP’s rule will
make the suggestion of Taiwan independence further expand in
Taiwan society” and that “certain people are still holding on to
the fantasy that ¶soft independence’ might be workable.”
352
In
April 2017, the PRC government complained that the Tsai ad-
ministration had “indulged and supported a series of activities
aimed at ¶de-sinicization’ and ¶Taiwan independence.’”
353
In May
2017, the official Xinhua news agency reported, “Over the past
year, the DPP administration has not ceased its promotion of de-
sinicization and ¶Taiwan independence’ activities in the island’s
cultural sector.”
354
In January 2018, Xinhua stressed “that any
attempt to separate Taiwan from China will not be tolerated.”
355
The spokesperson for the PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs
Office warned in October 2018 that “[a]ny separatist attempt
that relies on foreigners to build itself up, intensify antagonism,
damage cross-Strait relations or change Taiwan’s status is
doomed to fail.”
356
Law in Taiwan has always been distinct from that used in the
PRC, but a conspicuous unmooring of the legal system from the
one originally established by the ROC government is yet another
manifestation of a move away from the cross-strait status quo.
It is not just a question of whether the contents of the ROC legal
system are in flux, but rather whether the ROC legal system is
being supplanted by a Taiwanese system. Professors Jiunn-rong
Yeh and Wen-Chen Chang explain, for example, how “incremen-
tal reforms have brought Taiwan a vibrant constitutional democ-
racy whose institutions and respective functions are very differ-
ent from what was originally written in the ROC Constitu-
tion.”
357
Interestingly, the Tsai administration’s report on the
352. Cross-Strait Ties Enter Era of Uncertainty Under Tsai, GLOBAL TIMES
(May 20, 2016), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/984175.shtml.
353. Endorsing One-China Principle Only Way to Break Deadlock in Cross-
Strait Ties: Spokesperson, XINHUA NET (Apr. 28, 2017,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/28/c_136244368.htm.
354. Xinhua Insight: What Has DPP Brought to Taiwan Over the Past Year?,
XINHUA NET (May 20, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
05/20/c_136299231.htm.
355. Attempt to Split China Not to Be Tolerated, XINHUANET (Jan. 31, 2018),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/31/c_136939759.htm.
356. Separatist Attempt Doomed to Fail: Chinese Mainland Spokesperson,
XINHUA NET (Oct. 10, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
10/10/c_137523851.htm.
357. Yeh & Chang, supra note 76, at 822.
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2017 Reform Conference begins by stating that judicial reform
is the issue of utmost concern to the “Taiwanese” (“台灣人”).
358
The only times that the 152-page report even mentions the “Re-
public of China” is in proper names and in dates that follow the
convention of using the ROC founding to count years.
359
The
2017 Reform Conference was about Taiwan’s legal system, not
that of the ROC.
It is highly improbable that Beijing would deem cultivating a
distinct legal identity alone as a sufficient attempt “to separate
Taiwan from China” such that retaliatory measures were war-
ranted. Nonetheless, the more that legal reforms appear to be
the creation of a uniquely Taiwanese legal system³and partic-
ularly one that emphasizes the openness and participation so
lacking in the PRC³the more that this phenomenon looks like
yet another step towards soft independence.
Stating “Taiwan” instead of “Republic of China” in the report
is, admittedly, only words on paper. The more interesting test
will come as legal reforms take hold in increasingly conspicuous
ways. At present, there is no indication that the PRC leader-
ship’s view of legal reforms across the strait is a factor that peo-
ple in Taiwan are pondering in setting the reform agenda. Even
if people in Taiwan involved in the reform process have cross-
strait relations at least somewhat in mind, it would be surpris-
ing if Taiwanese officials said openly that their decisions on do-
mestic legal issues were being influenced by concerns about how
Beijing might respond. Nor has the PRC leadership expressed
its views publicly on the legal reform discussions that are cur-
rently underway in Taiwan. The May 2019 same-sex marriage
bill did, however, prompt a cross-strait tiff. The PRC’s People’s
Daily tweeted, “Local lawmakers in #Taiwan, China, have legal-
ized same-sex marriage in a first for Asia, according to local me-
dia reports.”
360
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs retorted,
358. 2017 Reform Conference Report, supra note 138, at 3.
359. For example, the Report mentions the “ROC” Bar Association (中華民國
律師公會), but even the Bar Association translates its name as the “Taiwan Bar
Association” despite “Taiwan” not being in the Chinese version. See
http://www.twba.org.tw/en/News.asp. In President Tsai’s 2018 National Day
address, she “used the term ¶Taiwan’ 48 times, compared with four mentions
of ¶Republic of China’ and two references to the ¶Republic of China in Taiwan.’”
Horton, supra note 59.
360. People’s Daily, China (@PDChina), TWITTER (May 17, 2019, 12:09 AM),
https://twitter.com/PDChina/status/1129282711695314944.
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WRONG! The bill was passed by our national parliament &
will be signed by the president soon. Democratic #Taiwan is a
country in itself & has nothing to do with authoritarian
#China. [People’s Daily] is a commie brainwasher & it sucks.
JW [Joseph Wu, Minister of Foreign Affairs].
361
It is unknown whether this Twitter-spat will be anomaly or,
instead, if Taiwan’s domestic legal landscape will become a more
pronounced element in cross-strait tensions. Nevertheless, the
more Taiwan moves away from the established ROC legal sys-
tem, the more examples there will be of the “soft independence”
to which Beijing staunchly objects. Nurturing a distinctive Tai-
wanese legal identity³like so many aspects of government poli-
cies in Taiwan³is thus at least tacitly connected to cross-strait
relations. The connection could become more visible if the incho-
ate identity of the legal system feeds into strengthening a sense
of national identity that values civic engagement, especially vis-
à-vis the lack of civil and political rights currently available to
people in the PRC.
362
Legal reforms are thus neither an explicit item in the list of
complaints that Beijing has against the Tsai administration, nor
are they irrelevant.
363
A question then is how to articulate what
361. 外交部 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC (Taiwan) (@MOFA_Taiwan),
TWITTER (May 18, 2019, 5:06 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/MOFA_Taiwan/status/1129901169906552833.
362. See generally CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, 2018 ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (Oct. 10, 2018) (reporting on “the dire human rights situation inside
China and the continued downward trajectory, by virtually every measure,
since Xi Jinping became Communist Party General Secretary in 2012 and
President in 2013 . . . .”).
363. There are legal issues, other than domestic legal reforms in Taiwan, that
are of direct concern in cross-strait relations. See, e.g., Greg Torode & J.R. Wu,
Taiwan Enters South China Sea Legal Fray, As Group Seeks to Sway Interna-
tional Court, REUTERS (May 10, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
southchinasea-taiwan/taiwan-enters-south-china-sea-legal-fray-as-group-
seeks-to-sway-international-court-idUSKCN0Y02LD (law of the sea issues
over disputed islands); Yu-jie Chen & Jerome A. Cohen, Beijing and Taipei
Should End Their Tug of War Over Repatriation of Criminal Suspects, S.CHINA
MORNINGPOST (H.K.) (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/2023276/beijing-and-taipei-should-end-their-tug-war-over (is-
sues over transfer of criminal suspects); Lewis, supra note 23 (issues over di-
vergent views of what constitutes a criminal offense versus exercise of pro-
tected freedoms, as exemplified by the case of imprisoned Taiwanese activist
Lee Ming-che).
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role they do play in the delicate cross-strait relationship. Gun-
ther Teubner coined the term “legal irritant” to describe how
transplanted laws can disrupt an established legal system and
trigger a host of unexpected events.
364
Although Teubner devel-
oped the term totally outside of the context of cross-strait rela-
tions, the idea of “legal irritant” takes on a twist here: the forging
of Taiwan’s legal identity could be seen as an irritant that is le-
gal in nature. Instead of following the advice of “Never Tickle a
Sleeping Dragon,”
365
championing a dramatic shift away from
the status quo of the traditional ROC legal system is one more
unwanted tickle of the already-awake dragon in Beijing. The
dragon’s irritation could become more pronounced if, for in-
stance, the public in Taiwan takes an active role in the legal sys-
tem’s scrutiny of government officials. A common question is
what would have been the outcome of former President Chen
Shui-bian’s corruption case if the trial had included lay
judges.
366
That Taiwan is seriously contemplating such hypo-
theticals stands in marked contrast to the ongoing anti-corrup-
tion campaign in the PRC that is firmly within the CCP’s secre-
tive hands.
367
In contrast to the PRC, people in Taiwan already
364. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
365. Hogwarts: Never Tickle a Sleeping Dragon, HARRY POTTER LEXICON,
https://www.hp-lexicon.org/thing/never-tickle-sleeping-dragon/ (motto of Hog-
warts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, described by author J.K. Rolling as
an “entirely practical piece of advice for the Hogwarts school motto”). While
similar to the proverb cautioning “let sleeping dogs lie,” one can only imagine
the destruction that a dragon could wreak versus a dog.
366. See, e.g., Jingda Jiaoshou Lin Yushun: Guomin 「Faguan」 Guanliao
Sifa (警大教授林裕順：國民「法官」官僚司法) [Central Policy University Pro-
fessor Lin Yushun: Citizen “Judges” Bureaucratize Justice], APPLEDAILY (蘋果
日報) (Dec. 8, 2017), https://tw.apple-
daily.com/new/realtime/20171208/1255359/. For background on how Chen’s
case tarnished the reputations of judges and prosecutors, see Political Corrup-
tion in Taiwan: Trial and Error, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2009), https://www.econ-
omist.com /node/12991373. For how this case haunted the judicial system, see
Chung Li-hua & Jake Chung, Control Yuan to Investigate Chen Skit, TAIPEI
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ar-
chives/2018/02/23 /2003688073.
367. See Chris Buckley, In China, Fears That New Anticorruption Agency
Will Be Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/11/29/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-anticorruption.html (report-
ing that Xi “is pushing to establish a new anticorruption agency with sweeping
powers to sidestep the courts and lock up anyone on the government payroll
for months without access to a lawyer”).
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have a direct say in their government via one-person-one-vote
elections. Having the citizenry further directly weigh in on the
fate of their government’s officials when accused of misdeeds
would make the polarity across the strait all the starker.
In short, the more that the legal system applicable to the over
twenty-three million people who call Taiwan home looks both
uniquely Taiwanese and distinctly not Chinese, the more that
Beijing has another example to label pejoratively as de-Siniciza-
tion. Overtures from Beijing that it would continue to allow Tai-
wan a high-degree of autonomy under a “one country, two sys-
tems” model also are met with intense distrust.
368
The erosion of
freedoms in Hong Kong makes for a cautionary tale, with these
concerns having prompted millions of Hong Kongers to protest
as this Article goes to print.
369
When receiving the O’Connor Jus-
tice Prize in February 2018, former Hong Kong Chief Secretary
Anson Chan warned, “[I]t has become clear that Beijing is now
bent on molding Hong Kong’s governance to become more closely
aligned with that of the mainland, while still maintaining that
¶One Country, Two Systems’ remains alive and well.”
370
Taiwan’s
legal system by comparison, is increasingly unaligned with that
of the PRC, with no signs of this trend changing.
CONCLUSION
A frequent refrain is the need to maintain the status quo in
cross-strait relations.
371
At a February 2018 event with foreign
diplomats, President Tsai reaffirmed that she would not depart
368. Bush, What Xi Jinping Said About Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress,
supra note 346 (noting Xi reiterated “one country, two systems” as the “guiding
principle (fangzhen) of peaceful reunification”).
369. See, e.g., Huge Turnout by Protesters Keeps Heat on Hong Kong’s Leader,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/06/16/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html (“Organizers said
nearly two million people joined the rally, while the police estimated that
338,000 protesters turned up at the peak of the demonstration along a previ-
ously agreed-upon procession route, implying that its count did not include
people who spilled over on to adjacent and parallel roads”).
370. Anson Chan Wins O’Connor Justice Prize, ARIZ. ST. U. (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://campus.asu.edu/content/anson-chan-wins-o%E2%80%99connor-jus-
tice-prize-0.
371. See Ching-hsin Yu, The Centrality of Maintaining the Status Quo in Tai-
wan Elections, BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opin-
ions/the-centrality-of-maintaining-the-status-quo-in-taiwan-elections/.
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from the status quo.
372
There is much room to debate what ex-
actly “status quo” means, but all agree it falls somewhere be-
tween, on the one extreme, the PRC and Taiwan combining into
a single state with a common government exercising effective
control and, on the other, de jure independence for Taiwan under
that name. The status quo is a point of repose, but not a final
resolution.
Taipei’s pursuit of quietude with Beijing contrasts with the in-
tentional disruption at home. President Tsai moved quickly after
her inauguration to address long-brewing dissatisfaction with
the legal system. The infusion of public voices has pressed for
greater transparency, clarity, and participation as part of ongo-
ing legal-reform discussions. There are indications that these
values are starting to take hold. The legal system is untethered
from its ROC historical roots, and a new inchoate legal identity
is being forged.
In time, collective connections with the legal system could be-
come one of many facets of what it means to be “Taiwanese,”
emboldening the people that they are part of the legal system,
not just objects upon which it acts. This process will likely grad-
ually play out against the complicated backdrop of Taiwan’s
unique status. Yet the timeline could also be more condensed.
Two former presidents endorsed holding an independence refer-
endum in 2019,
373
and a pro-independence rally and march in
October 2018 drew thousands of people.
374
These initiatives fiz-
zled and a referendum to jettison the ROC name is unlikely. The
endorsement was, however, a reminder that the citizenry has
the power to go beyond defining what it means in the abstract to
be Taiwanese to using their votes to resolve the ultimate ques-
tion of what Taiwan means.
372. See Taiwan’s President Assures World’s Representatives of Cross-Strait
Status Quo, TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.tai-
wannews.com.tw/en/news/3373440.
373. See Taiwan Independence Referendum Launched, Backed by Former
Presidents, FOCUS TAIWAN (Feb. 28, 2018), http://fo-
custaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201802280006.aspx.
374. See Horton, supra note 59.
